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Philosophical Problems in Contemporary Art Criticism: Objectivism, Poststructuralism, 
and the Axiom of Authorship 
It is absurd to hold that a man ought to be ashamed of being unable to defend himself with his 
limbs, but not of being unable to defend himself with rational speech, when the use of rational 
speech … can confer the greatest of benefits … Before some audiences, not even the possession 
of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we say to produce conviction … [Here] we 
must be able to employ persuasion, just as deduction can be employed, on opposite sides of a 
question – not in order that we may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not make 
people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and that, if 
another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute him. 
– Aristotle ([350 BC] 1995: 4622-4623) 
1. Introduction 
In response to questions regarding one’s reasons for practicing a martial art, one of the most 
common answers given is self-defense, the desire to equip oneself with the tools necessary to live 
confidently in the world ready for whatever physical attack may come. By contrast, in response 
to questions regarding one’s reasons for practicing philosophy, self-defense is rarely given as an 
answer. The precedent for philosophy-as-self-defense is the work of Aristotle, for whom 
philosophical argument was precisely a form of combat.1 In more recent history, the most 
prominent practitioner of philosophy-as-self-defense has been Ayn Rand. In her fiction writing, 
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most notably in The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged, but more extensively in her later non-
fiction writing, Rand developed a philosophical system she called Objectivism. Following 
Aristotle, Objectivism was intended by Rand to serve as a method of self-defense, as a means to 
equip oneself with the tools necessary to live confidently in the world ready for whatever 
intellectual attack may come.  
In an address given, fittingly enough, at West Point to the graduating class of 1974, Rand 
maintained that one must study even philosophical ideas that seem to be “blatantly false,” to 
“make no sense,” and to “bear no relation to real life,” for if one fails to understand such ideas, 
one is “vulnerable to the worst among them” (Rand [1974a] 1982: 7-8). Connecting philosophy 
to military combat, Rand elaborated: 
In [the military], you know the importance of keeping track of the enemy’s weapons, 
strategy, and tactics – and of being prepared to counter them. The same is true in 
philosophy: You have to understand the enemy’s ideas and be prepared to refute them, 
you have to know his basic arguments and be able to blast them (Rand [1974a] 1982: 7-
8). 
Broadly speaking, Objectivism represents a comprehensive view of existence, what Rand liked 
to call “a philosophy for living on Earth” (Rand [1974a] 1982: 10). She broke Objectivism down 
into five major branches – metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, politics, and aesthetics – though 
she stressed that the first three branches were of fundamental importance. As she explained with 
reference to politics (and this explanation applies equally to aesthetics):  
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[Objectivism] does not regard politics as a separate or primary goal – that is, as a goal 
that can be achieved without a wider ideological context. Politics is based on three other 
philosophical disciplines: metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics – on a theory of man’s 
nature and of man’s relationship to existence. It is only on such a base that one can 
formulate a consistent political theory and achieve it in practice … [Thus,] Objectivism 
advocates certain political principles … as the consequence and the ultimate practical 
application of its fundamental philosophical principles (Rand 1962: 1). 
This is an important point. Moreover, it is a valid point. Yet, it does not explain the comparative 
lack of interest shown by Objectivists – and even by Rand herself – in defending aesthetics or 
applying Objectivist principles to aesthetics.2 And this neglect is one of the many reasons why 
the realm of contemporary art criticism is little more than an intellectual wasteland. The force 
that has for decades been destroying art criticism is a force that Rand once had occasion to go up 
against: The force of the unreadable. An unreadable book or essay, as explicated by Rand, “does 
not count on men’s intelligence, but on their weaknesses, pretensions, and fears”; it “is not a tool 
of enlightenment, but of intellectual intimidation”; and it “is not aimed at the reader’s 
understanding, but at his inferiority complex” (Rand [1973a] 1982: 117). Strangely, the 
unreadable seemed to Rand to be an unstoppable force. For all her optimism, when it came to the 
force of the unreadable, she did not appear to have much hope: 
Within a few years [of the publication of an unreadable book or essay], commentators 
will begin to fill libraries with works analyzing, “clarifying,” and interpreting its 
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mysteries. Their notions will spread all over the academic map, ranging from the 
appeasers, who will try to soften [its] meaning – to the glamorizers, who will ascribe to it 
nothing worse than their own pet inanities – to the compromisers, who will try to 
reconcile its theory with its exact opposite – to the avant-garde, who will spell out and 
demand the acceptance of its logical consequences. The contradictory, antithetical nature 
of such interpretations will be ascribed to [its] profundity – particularly by those who 
function on the motto: “If I don’t understand it, it’s deep.” The students will believe that 
the professors know the proof of [its] theory, the professors will believe that the 
commentators know it, the commentators will believe that the author knows it – and the 
author will be alone to know that no proof exists and that none was offered. Within a 
generation, the number of commentaries will have grown to such proportions that the 
original [unreadable book or essay] will be accepted as a subject of philosophical 
specialization, requiring a lifetime of study – and any refutation of [its] theory will be 
ignored or rejected if unaccompanied by a full discussion of the theories of all the 
commentators, a task which no one will be able to undertake (Rand [1973a] 1982: 117-
118). 
Against the appeasers, the glamorizers, the compromisers, and the avant-garde stands the 
“intelligent man.” Far from valiantly defending reason, though, the intelligent man, on Rand’s 
account, will simply reject the unreadable, “refusing to waste his time on untangling what he 
perceives to be gibberish” (Rand [1973a] 1982: 117). Is it any wonder that the unreadable has 
proceeded, unabated, to permeate the philosophy of art to the point where “the philosophy of art” 
is merely another name for “the unreadable”? If “the man able to refute its arguments will not 
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(unless he has the endurance of an elephant and the patience of a martyr)” (Rand [1973a] 1982: 
117), then what hope is there for aesthetics? What is there for scholars to do but pray for a 
miracle?  
In Atlas Shrugged, John Galt addresses the last of his words to the “heroes who might still be 
hidden in the world, those who are held prisoner not by their evasions but by their virtues and 
their desperate courage” (Rand 1957: 1060). By the same token, this essay is addressed to the 
heroes still hidden in the field of art criticism, those who want but who are unsure of how to 
formulate a rational philosophy of art. In accordance with the sentiment that “it is impossible to 
predict the time of a philosophical Renaissance,” Rand once expressed the thought that the most 
one can do is “define the road to follow” (Rand [1969] 1975: 115). I hope that this essay may, at 
the very least, serve as a helpful signpost on the road to an Objectivist aesthetics. In what 
follows, I will provide a practical example of such an elephantine endeavor by refuting the 
philosophy of art promulgated by proponents of the philosophical school of poststructuralism 
propaedeutic to the construction of an Objectivist aesthetics.  
Before proceeding to refute the aesthetic principles of poststructuralism, however, I would be 
remiss vis-à-vis “Rand’s Razor”3 if I did not first clarify my own aesthetic principles. The 
aesthetic principles on which my conception of an Objectivist aesthetics is based proceed from 
what I call the axiom of authorship. An axiom, Rand explained, is “a statement that identifies the 
base of knowledge and of any further statement pertaining to that knowledge, a statement 
necessarily contained in all others, whether any particular speaker chooses to identify it or not.” 
Furthermore, an axiom “defeats its opponents by the fact that they have to accept it and use it in 
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the process of any attempt to deny it” (Rand 1957: 1040). The metaphysical axiom at the heart of 
Objectivism is existence exists, the propositional form of which is A is A. The axiomatic concepts 
that result from this axiom are existence, identity, and consciousness; they follow from the axiom 
and its two corollaries: First, that something exists which one perceives, and second, that one 
exists possessing consciousness, consciousness being the faculty of perceiving that which exists. 
To simplify: Existence is Identity, Consciousness is Identification (Rand 1957: 1016).  
In an Objectivist aesthetics, then, authorship is an artistic axiom since, by speaking about art at 
all, one is conceding the axiom of authorship, for art is a product of creation and creation 
presupposes an entity capable of and responsible for creating. To this end, the aesthetic 
principles to which the axiom of authorship gives rise and on which my conception of an 
Objectivist aesthetics is based are the following:  
1) The Objectivity Principle – An artwork exists independent of the act of 
reading/listening/viewing (for without the artwork, there would be nothing to read/listen to/view) 
and an artwork is what it is independent of the act of interpretation (for without the artwork, 
there would be nothing to interpret). 
2) The Identity Principle – An interpretation of an artwork can be considered valid only if it 
adequately explains what the artwork is and why the artwork is the way it is. 
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3) The Causality Principle – An artwork is a made object; thus, explanations as to what an 
artwork is and why an artwork is the way it is must consider the intentions of the person who 
created the artwork, i.e., its author. 
These three aesthetic principles seem eminently straightforward if not self-evident. 
Unfortunately, despite the considerable boon to the analysis of art provided by the axiom of 
authorship, there appeared in the 1960s a plethora of misguided “radicals” keen to challenge the 
“authority” of the author and to institute a new model of criticism. As one of the lone voices of 
reason then working in the field of literary theory, E.D. Hirsch maintained that it was essential 
for philosophers of art to not only understand the epistemological conditions of possibility for the 
“heavy and largely victorious assault on the sensible belief that a text means what its author 
meant” that is the legacy of 20th Century aesthetics, but even more importantly, “to determine 
how far the theory of [textual] autonomy deserves acceptance” (Hirsch 1967: 1-2). The same is 
true today. However, in the interest of conceptual clarity, I would argue, pace Hirsch, that what 
is essential is to understand that the very notion of “textual autonomy” is nonsense. In any 
rational philosophy of art, the concept of authorship must be the conceptual alpha and omega. 
Yet, if the history of 20th Century aesthetics is any indication, no concept has been the target of 
more, or more violent, attacks than the concept of authorship.  
Challenges to author-based criticism have come from diverse individuals from a variety of 
academic and non-academic backgrounds, but because its contemporaneity, its extremism, and 
its considerable influence make for a troubling combination, I will focus exclusively in this essay 
on the philosophical school of poststructuralism. More specifically, I will interrogate the 
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influential work of poststructuralist avatars Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida to the end of 
proving that they both fail to make a prima facie case against authorship.4 Before doing so, 
however, I should emphasize that my engagements with Barthes and Derrida will not merely be 
critical engagements; more to the point, they will be polemical engagements. Since I do not 
believe in pulling my punches, this essay will proceed according to what Simon Critchley has 
referred to as an “economy of viciousness” (Critchley 2007: xiv). To Critchley’s mind, polemics 
are an “intellectually healthy” activity with “sharp philosophical edges” (Critchley 2007: xiv). In 
a similar vein, Stephen Prince has encouraged “spirited opposition” not only because it can serve 
as a “measure of vitality” with respect to a given field but because “the flash and fire of 
[polemics] can illuminate [a] field’s basic and often unexamined assumptions and methods, its 
very history and traditions” (Prince 1992: 49). This is what D.N. Rodowick calls “the value of 
being disagreeable” (Rodowick 2013): Given that an argument is “a public and social event open 
to conversation and debate, agreements and disagreements,” there is the potential, through 
polemical engagements, of “transform[ing] the terms of debate, the language in which it is 
expressed, and the nature of the epistemological and axiological commitments that have been 
entered into” (Rodowick 2015: 79).   
Transforming the terms of debates in the philosophy of art and encouraging philosophers of art 
to transform their epistemological and axiological commitments are two of the most pressing 
issues facing the practice of art criticism. However, given the “crushing weight of the 
philosophical wreckage under which generations [of scholars] have been brought up” (Rand 
[1969] 1975: 94), it is clear that, to precipitate such a seismic philosophical shift, polite 
conversation will not suffice. Stanley Cavell once opined that “lines are to be drawn, or what’s a 
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conversation for?” (Cavell 1981: 227). This is the polemical position from which I will now 
commence with the drawing of lines.  
2. Roland Barthes and the Attempted Murder of the Author 
In 1967, Roland Barthes published a short polemic entitled “The Death of the Author.” Despite 
the fact that Barthes’ call-to-arms is made up of conspicuous logical fallacies, contradictions, and 
equivocations – to say nothing of its toxic Nietzschean “morality” – “The Death of the Author” 
still holds sway in a number of academic circles half a century later. In fact, in the years since the 
publication of this extraordinarily influential essay, the author has been disavowed in virtually 
every critical and theoretical context across the humanities.5 In an effort to restore the concept of 
authorship to its rightful place as the conceptual alpha and omega in the philosophy of art, I will 
subject Barthes’ influential essay to a sustained interrogation in which I will identify and 
condemn the logical and moral shortcomings of what I will hereafter refer to as Barthes’ 
attempted murder of the author. Ultimately, I will argue that Barthes’ failure in “The Death of 
the Author” is not, strictly speaking, a failure of knowledge, but rather, in Cavell’s terminology, a 
failure of acknowledgment: 
Acknowledging is not an alternative to knowing … In incorporating, or inflecting, the 
concept of knowledge, the concept of acknowledgment is meant, in my use, to declare 
that what there is to be known philosophically remains unknown not through ignorance 
… but through a refusal of knowledge, a denial or a repression of knowledge, say even a 
killing of it (Cavell [1986a] 1988: 51). 
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In one sense, then, “The Death of the Author,” inasmuch as it represents a failure of logic and 
morality, may seem irrelevant (or anathema) to the construction of an Objectivist aesthetics. In 
another sense, however, its logical and moral shortcomings may be considered instructive and, as 
such, indispensable. This latter sense aligns with the philosophical practice of J.L. Austin, who 
maintained that identifying and mastering techniques for “dissolving philosophical worries” is a 
crucial skill in the realm of philosophical argumentation; as he observed, “there is nothing so 
plain boring as the constant repetition of assertions that are not true, and sometimes not even 
faintly sensible,” and if the cultivation of philosophical habits conducive to rational thought 
allows for nonsensical assertions (such as those of which “The Death of the Author” is 
composed) to be dissolved, “it will be all to the good” (Austin 1962: 5).6
Unfortunately, due to the schizophrenic sloppiness with which Barthes presents his argument in 
“The Death of the Author,” discerning what exactly he is arguing at any given moment and how 
the entire argument hangs together is no easy feat (never mind dissolving the philosophical 
worries therein). In fact, even at this preliminary stage of my critique, there has already been a 
misstep, for to speak of the argument in “The Death of the Author” implies that it consists of one 
argument. To be more precise, “The Death of the Author” consists of two arguments. And, as if 
this is not confusing enough, within each of these arguments, Barthes vacillates between an 
extreme version and a moderate version.  
On the one hand, in what I will refer to as the production argument, Barthes calls for a paradigm 
shift in artistic production. In the extreme version, writing calls for a “prerequisite 
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impersonality” (how writing “calls for” this “impersonality,” Barthes does not say). In the 
moderate version, writing does not “call for” a prerequisite impersonality, but the author is 
nevertheless supposed to approach art impersonally and to intentionally suppress his “authority” 
so as to allow language to work its magic (why and by whom the author is “supposed” to 
approach art impersonally, Barthes does not say). Even though the terms of the extreme version 
and the moderate version are different, they are both designed to bring art to the Barthesian 
“utopia” in which “it is language which speaks, not the author” (Barthes [1967] 1977: 143). 
On the other hand, in what I will refer to as the reception argument, Barthes also calls for a 
paradigm shift in artistic reception. Ironically, the very existence of the reception argument 
proves that the extreme version of the production argument is nonsense. After all, if language 
were the only volitional entity in production (i.e., if the author did not have a role to play in the 
first place), then there would be no need to make an argument for reception based on the premise 
that language is the only volitional entity in production. It would be self-evident. Thus, both the 
extreme version and the moderate version of the reception argument are related to the moderate 
version of the production argument.  
The moderate version of the reception argument follows from the implementation of the 
moderate version of the production argument: Once art has been transformed into an arena 
wherein authors willingly submit to language, readers may thus dispense with the notion of 
deciphering art and may concern themselves solely with disentangling it.7 However, in the event 
that there are authors who refuse to submit to language, then the extreme version of the reception 
argument is deployed. In the extreme version, the “revolutionary” reader is supposed to “refuse 
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God and his hypostases – reason, science, law” and forcibly remove the author (why and by 
whom the reader is “supposed” to “remove” the author, Barthes does not say) (Barthes [1967] 
1977: 147). 
Fueling these two arguments is a putative quest to “liberate” art from the “tyranny” of the author, 
after which “the people” may rejoice in the jouissance of the “infinitely polysemous” text. 
Barthes puts on the airs of Robin Hood, but the key point to be made is that this is merely 
misdirection. Operating beneath his alleged quest for liberation is a far more sinister project 
(which he would later refer to as the construction of a “hedonistic aesthetics”8) the end result of 
which is out-and-out murder. Of course, Barthes does not explicitly endorse (at least not initially) 
the murder of the author. Instead, he proceeds as if his arguments are strictly, even peaceably, 
logical. Thus, the first problems to arise in “The Death of the Author” are relatively 
straightforward problems of logic; in both the production argument and the reception argument, 
and in both the extreme versions and the moderate versions of each, Barthes relies at every turn 
on two logical fallacies.  
The first fallacy is the fallacy Rand terms concept stealing, whereby one denies the primacy of a 
putatively invalid concept (e.g., authorship) and then asserts the primacy of a derivative concept 
(e.g., art) (Rand 1957: 1039-1040). The second fallacy is the fallacy Rand terms package 
dealing, whereby one attempts to integrate into a unified conceptual whole, or package, a series 
of contradictory concepts/premises (e.g., conflating the author and God) (Rand [1973b] 1982: 
28-29). These two fallacies are at work in both of the arguments running throughout “The Death 
of the Author.” According to the production argument, Barthes claims that artistic production is 
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not (in the extreme version) or should not be (in the moderate version) a matter of people 
“expressing themselves,” but rather, a matter of allowing language to “express itself” through 
them. Theoretically, Barthes formulates the extreme version of the production argument in the 
following manner:
Enunciation is an empty process, functioning perfectly without there being any need for it 
to be filled with the person of the interlocutors … Language knows a “subject,” not a 
“person,” and this subject, empty outside of the very enunciation which defines it, 
suffices to make language “hold together” (Barthes [1967] 1977: 145).
Applying this nonsensical theoretical model to actual artistic practice, Barthes outlines the 
process as follows:
The modern scriptor can thus no longer believe, as according to the pathetic view of his 
predecessors, that this hand is too slow for his thought or passion … On the contrary, the 
hand, cut off from any voice, borne by a pure gesture of inscription (and not of 
expression), traces a field without origin – or which, at least, has no other origin than
language itself (Barthes [1967] 1977: 146).
These formulations lead to the major contradiction that contributes to the collapse of the 
production argument. In the moderate version of the production argument, Barthes tries to 
preserve the concept of intention without the concepts of identity or consciousness. This is a 
straightforward case of concept stealing, for intention presupposes an entity capable of intending, 
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which in turn presupposes the concepts of identity and consciousness. In the extreme version of 
the production argument, however, Barthes shifts from concept stealing to package dealing, 
anthropomorphizing capital-L “Language” and then proceeding to deny that either consciousness 
or intention are attributable to human beings, thus leaving Language as the only “conscious” 
entity possessing volition and thus capable, by some unexplained supernatural means, of 
intending.9
Interestingly, Barthes opts for a positive conception of the “pure” functionality of Language akin 
to the popular (mis)reading of the Hegelian “Cunning of Reason” as opposed to the negative 
conception of the insidiousness of language often attributed to Jacques Lacan.10 In either case, it 
is Language that is posited as possessing volition and thus capable of intending, although 
whether it is Language that possesses volition while human beings do not, as in the extreme 
version, or whether both Language and human beings possess volition but human beings are to 
cede their volition to Language, as in the moderate version, both pictures of language are 
nonsense.11 Undeterred, Barthes astonishingly tries to bolster the extreme version of the 
production argument with reference to ordinary language philosophy as if it confirms his thesis 
when, in point of fact, ordinary language philosophy is its antithesis (Barthes [1967] 1977: 145-
146). Cavell provides a clear description of the perspective of ordinary language philosophy on 
language and communication, a description which illuminates how fundamentally it contradicts 
Barthes’ antihumanist model:
There must, [in language], be reasons for what you say … if what you say is to be 
comprehensible. We can understand what the words mean apart from understanding why 
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you say them, but apart from understanding the point of your saying them, we cannot 
understand what you mean … The emphasis is [thus] on the fact that [expressions] are
said (or, of course, written) by human beings, to human beings, in definite contexts, in a 
language they share: hence the obsession with the use of expressions (Cavell 1979: 206). 
The final piece of corroborating evidence against the extreme version of the production argument 
is, ironically, Barthes’ own critical practice. When he has occasion to lament the “sway of the 
author” and how powerful it has proven to be, he claims that “certain writers have long since 
attempted to loosen it” (Barthes [1967] 1977: 143). To Barthes’ mind, writers such as Stéphane 
Mallarmé, Paul Valéry, and Marcel Proust intended in their work – and, as far as Barthes was 
concerned, followed through successfully on their intentions – to problematize in various ways 
and to varying degrees the concept of authorship. Counter-intuitive and self-destructive though 
this intention may be, the fact remains that Barthes’ assessment of these men’s respective work 
as attempts to challenge the sway of the author relies for its persuasiveness on intentions imputed 
to Mallarmé-as-author, Valéry-as-author, and Proust-as-author.12
Having invalidated the extreme version of the production argument, the moderate version, where 
the author accedes to the “will” of Language, may still seem viable. The reason Barthes believes 
Mallarmé stands out is because, as Barthes puts it, he recognized “the necessity to substitute 
language itself for the person who until then had been supposed to be its owner” (Barthes [1967] 
1977: 143).13 There are a number of questions that seem worth asking here: How did Mallarmé 
recognize this “necessity”? How does one “substitute language itself” for the “person”? Why is it 
necessary to do so? Beyond these obvious questions, a less obvious question is also hovering in 
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the background: Who benefits from such a substitution? These questions are meant to underscore 
the fact that “The Death of the Author” does not merely exemplify a corruption of logic. Even 
more important to recognize, “The Death of the Author” exemplifies a corruption of morality.
Early in “The Death of the Author,” Barthes observes that the value of the author (and thus of 
logic and reality) is related to “capitalist ideology, which has attached the greatest importance to 
the ‘person’ of the author” (Barthes [1967] 1977: 143). He is absolutely correct in this 
observation, which implies that the moral foundation of capitalism is the individual and his 
rights. Where he is wrong is in thinking this is a knock against either authorship or capitalism (or 
logic, or reality). On the basis of this observation and the implication that it indicates an error, it 
becomes clear that the link between the moderate version of the production argument and the 
moderate version of the reception argument is the morality of altruism. In the moral register, 
altruism is marshaled to oppose individualism, while, in the political register, Marxism is 
marshaled to oppose capitalism.14
According to Barthes’ altruistic aesthetic model, the author must sacrifice his individuality for 
the “good” of “the people.” Barthes states that “as soon as a fact is narrated … outside of any 
function other than that of the very practice of the symbol itself … the author enters into his own 
death” (Barthes [1967] 1977: 142). If, in Barthes’ altruistic aesthetics, it is necessary for the 
author to “substitute language itself” for his “person” – the moral/political implication of which 
is that the individual does not have the right, is not free, to exist for himself – and if, in doing so, 
he “enters into his own death” – the moral/political implication of which is that the individual 
must sacrifice himself for the sake of others – then what is necessary in Barthes’ aesthetics on 
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the part of the author is suicide.15 Worse yet: What happens if Barthes comes across an author 
who rejects the morality of altruism and who refuses to commit suicide? What happens if he 
comes across an author who instead lives according to a morality of individualism and who 
insists on the right to and the freedom of self-expression?  
In the event the extreme version of the production argument, in which language is a volitional 
entity that uses helpless and mindless human beings to produce texts by ineffable means, is 
invalid – which, as I hope to have convincingly demonstrated, it is – and if the conjunction of the 
moderate versions of the production argument and the reception argument, in which the author is 
required to sacrifice his individuality and commit suicide for the good of the people who may 
then do with the remaining text qua alms whatever they wish, is also invalid – which, as I hope 
to have convincingly demonstrated, it is – Barthes still needs a way to ensure that he is able to 
indulge in the jouissance of the infinitely polysemous text. In these circumstances, if the author 
refuses to commit suicide on Barthes’ command, then Barthes is left with only one option: 
Murder. 
Rand once observed that there are only two means by which people can deal with one another, 
logic or force, and that irrational and immoral people who cannot win by means of logic 
invariably resort to the use of force (Rand [1966] 1970: 66). Even though Rand made this 
observation before Barthes wrote “The Death of the Author,” it nevertheless serves as a perfect 
description of the path taken by Barthes over the course of his essay. Initially, Barthes attempts 
to disguise the murderous nature of his essay. To prove that he is not committing murder, he 
attempts to show, on logical grounds, that there simply is no author to be murdered: 
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Did [the author] wish to express himself, he ought at least to know that the inner “thing” 
he thinks to “translate” is itself only a ready-formed dictionary … Succeeding the Author, 
the scriptor no longer bears within him passions, humors, feelings, impressions, but rather 
this immense dictionary from which he draws a writing that can know no halt (Barthes 
[1967] 1977: 146-147).16
Barthes’ substitution of a “ready-formed dictionary” for the “self” allegedly “expressed” by the 
author signals the radicalization of a more modest argument of his from Writing Degree Zero. In 
this early text, Barthes begins from the premise that art has its roots “in the depths of the author’s 
personal and secret mythology” (Barthes [1953] 2012: 10). Unfortunately, Barthes’ explication 
of authorial intention is steeped in mysticism; he alternatively conceives authorial intention as 
“the writer’s ‘thing’” (Barthes [1953] 2012: 11), an “occult aspect” of his “carnal structure” that 
is “locked within [his] body” (Barthes [1953] 2012: 12), and a “miracle” of “transmutation” 
indicating a “supra-literary operation which carries man to the threshold of power and magic” 
(Barthes [1953] 2012: 12). Given the mercuriality of Barthes’ conception of authorship and how 
little time he invests in articulating its logic, it is hardly surprising that he proceeds to vitiate the 
concept by claiming that Language, insofar as it “remains full of the recollection of previous 
usage” and consists of signs with “a second-order memory which mysteriously persists in the 
midst of new meanings,” invariably “drowns the sound” of the author’s self-expression (Barthes 
[1953] 2012: 16-17).  
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While Barthes’ conception of Language in “The Death of the Author” is clearly carried over 
from Writing Degree Zero, his conception of authorship is demonstrably different. In Writing 
Degree Zero, Barthes grants the author a (limited) degree of autonomy. In “The Death of the 
Author,” however, Barthes begins from the premise that art “is the destruction of every voice, of 
every point of origin” (Barthes [1967] 1977: 143). Of course, recalling my point about the 
reception argument invalidating simply by virtue of its existence the extreme version of the 
production argument, if it were true that art is now/always was as destructive as Barthes claims, 
then insisting that authors sacrifice themselves in the spirit of altruism would be useless if not 
inconceivable.17 As if sensing the insufficiency of his precarious yoking together of the extreme 
and moderate versions of the production argument with the moderate version of the reception 
argument, Barthes resorts in the end to the extreme version of the reception argument. This 
entails a shift on Barthes’ part from speaking of the author being (naturally) succeeded (by the 
scriptor) to being (forcibly) removed (by the reader):
To give a text an author is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final 
signified, to close the writing. Such a conception suits criticism very well, the latter then 
allotting itself the important task of discovering the author … [and] when the author has 
been found, the text is “explained” – victory to the critic … It is [therefore] derisory to 
condemn the new writing in the name of a humanism hypocritically turned champion of 
the reader’s rights … We are now beginning to let ourselves be fooled no longer by the 
arrogant antiphrastical recriminations of good society in favor of the very thing it sets 
aside, ignores, smothers, or destroys; we know that, to give writing its future, it is 
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necessary to overthrow the myth: the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of 
the author (Barthes [1967] 1977: 147-148). 
This argument is the logical endpoint for “The Death of the Author,” its toxic “morality” 
culminating in unadulterated murder. There are so many things wrong with this passage that I 
will enumerate them in list form: 
1) The notion of giving a text an author is a package deal predicated on the author/God 
conflation.18 Authors are not given, they are acknowledged. Moreover, Barthes goes so far in this 
passage as to actually assume the role of God. At various points in “The Death of the Author,” 
Barthes makes references to refusing God and to anti-theological reading practices which reject 
the “theological” meaning of the Author-God (Barthes [1967] 1977: 146-148). By virtue of this 
passage, however, it is clear that what draws Barthes’ wrath is not the concept of God, but rather, 
the fact that he is not God. It is hubris, pure and simple, and following the “logic” of “the Lord 
giveth and the Lord taketh away,” Barthes-as-God assumes the position of being able to give to 
or take away from a text the author. The lunacy has here reached its apogee.19
2) Readers cannot impose limits on texts. The only choice readers have is to (a) read within the 
(author’s) limits or to (b) read beyond the (author’s) limits. In short: Writers write, readers read.20
3) By putting “explained” in quotes, Barthes is implying that, once the author is discovered, there 
is no more work to be done by criticism. This is a reductive conception of criticism and, quite 
simply, another straw man. 
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4) To imply that respecting the role of the author in art (which is to say, respecting the role of the 
human in the world) is not a humanist position while committing violence against the author and, 
by extension, art (which is to say, lashing out against humanity and the world) is a humanist 
position is an egregious reversal of the facts of reality and the only authentic display of hypocrisy 
and antiphrasis.21
For as intolerably affronting as these many crimes against logic and morality are, the greatest 
offense committed in this heinous passage is the construction of art as a violent arena in which 
authors and readers are pitted against one another and forced into gladiatorial combat. That 
Barthes’ hedonistic aesthetics ultimately reaches this point of out-and-out murder and mayhem 
should not be a surprise given its irrational and immoral premises, and in particular given its 
rejection of a capitalist model of artistic production, which, in Objectivist terms, may be 
described as follows: 
[The author] contributes the most to [the artistic community] but gets nothing except his 
material payment, receiving no intellectual bonus from others to add to the value of his 
time. [The reader] who, left to himself, would [be without art,] contributes nothing … 
Such is the nature of the “competition” between [author and reader]. Such is the pattern 
of “exploitation” for which you have damned [the author]. Such was the service [authors] 
were glad and willing to give. What did [they] ask in return? Nothing but freedom … 
Such was the price [they] asked, which you chose to reject as too high … You decided 
that you had a right to your [experience] but [they] had no right to [their expression] … 
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You did not care to [live] in terms of intelligence – you are now [living] in terms of 
brutality (Rand 1957: 1065). 
As Barthes’ hedonistic aesthetics reduces art to a pile of ash and humans to violent, mindless 
savages, there is an obvious question that remains: Is there a moral alternative? Is there a 
conception of art that does not lead to death and destruction? Fortunately, there is. The moral 
alternative to Barthes’ hedonistic aesthetics is a conception of art which is not predicated on 
looting, on demanding and taking the unearned, but on trading. Trade, Rand states in no 
uncertain terms, is “the moral symbol of respect for human beings” (Rand 1057: 1022), and she 
provides a practical demonstration of art as trade and author and critic as traders in the following 
passage: 
I do not care to be admired causelessly, emotionally, intuitively, instinctively – or 
blindly. I do not care for blindness in any form, I have too much to show – or for 
deafness, I have too much to say. I do not care to be admired by anyone’s heart – only by 
someone’s head. And when I find a customer with that invaluable capacity, then [art] is a 
mutual trade to mutual profit … [Hence,] the payment I demand … [is not merely] your 
enjoyment … [but more importantly] your understanding and the fact that your 
enjoyment was of the same nature as mine, that it came from the same source: from your 
intelligence, from the conscious judgment of a mind able to judge my work by the 
standard of the same values that went to [create] it – I mean, not the fact that you felt, but 
that you felt what I wished you to feel, not the fact that you admire my work, but that you 
admire it for the things I wished to be admired (Rand 1957: 782). 
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The problem in “The Death of the Author” is that the ideas of art as trade and author and critic as 
traders are anathema to Barthes. Art, according to Barthes’ moral code, is a matter of conquest, 
and he will be damned if he will allow himself to be conquered by any author. As Rand makes 
clear, though, art and its criticism come from the same source, which is not a source of victory or 
defeat, but rather, “from an inviolate capacity to see through one’s own eyes – which means: the 
capacity to perform a rational identification – which means: the capacity to see, to connect, and 
to make what had not been seen, connected, and made before” (Rand 1957: 783). A truly moral 
criticism does not encourage critics to commit violence against the authors who have 
demonstrated their capacity to see through their own eyes and communicate their philosophies of 
life in their art; rather, a moral criticism encourages the mutuality, the connection, the harmony, 
the acknowledgment between critic and author whereby a critic is moved to respond to an author 
whose philosophy of life resonates (for better or worse) with his own.22
The critic who “believes in” (i.e., who values) the author is, in Barthes’ estimation, a pathetic 
fraud; yet, the critic he envisions – the pirate who pillages and plunders art indifferent to (or, 
worse yet, gleeful at the prospect of) its destruction – is to be considered a moral ideal? This 
inversion of morality is the logical result of an irrational moral code that values the murder of the 
author as the height of critical nobility, the destruction of art as a demonstration of critical 
brilliance, and death as the standard of life. This inversion of morality is equally the logical proof 
of Barthes’ guilt, for if a moral crime is, as Rand defines it, the attempt to create, through words 
or actions, an impression of the irrational – and thereby shake the concept of rationality in others 
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(Rand 1957: 488) – then Roland Barthes is a moral criminal whom scholars have been aiding and 
abetting for half a century. 
3. Jacques Derrida and the Failure to Communicate 
Over the course of a historical survey of philosophy, Rand identifies two figures – the man of 
faith and the man of force – that stand out as “philosophical archetypes, psychological symbols, 
and historical reality”:
As philosophical archetypes, they embody two variants [of mysticism]. As psychological 
symbols, they represent the basic motivation of a great many men who exist in any era, 
culture, or society. As historical reality, they are the actual rulers of most of mankind’s 
societies, who rise to power whenever men abandon reason. The essential characteristics 
of these two remain the same in all ages: Attila, the man who rules by brute force, acts on 
the range of the moment, is concerned with nothing but the physical reality immediately 
before him, respects nothing but man’s muscles, and regards a fist, a club, or a gun as the 
only answer to any problem – and the Witch Doctor, the man who dreads physical reality, 
dreads the necessity of practical action, and escapes into his emotions, into visions of 
some mystic realm where his wishes enjoy a supernatural power unlimited by the 
absolute of nature (Rand 1961: 10). 
To shift from the writings of Roland Barthes to those of Jacques Derrida is, on Rand’s terms, to 
shift from an Attila to a Witch Doctor, from a thinker who traffics primarily in brute force to a 
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thinker who traffics primarily in mystic faith. Of course, faith and force are not mutually 
exclusive. There is an Attila in every Witch Doctor and a Witch Doctor in every Attila. Indeed, 
Rand points out that “both feel secretly inadequate to the task of dealing with existence” and 
hence “come to need each other” (Rand 1961: 14). Nevertheless, the distinction between an 
Attila and a Witch Doctor is worth preserving, for it speaks to the vicissitudes of philosophical 
failure beyond sheer evil. 
In an insightful consideration of the role of ethics in philosophy, David Kelley stresses that moral 
judgments in philosophy are only valid if they are supported “by observing how a person thinks, 
by attending to his reasoning rather than his conclusions in isolation”:
In judging rationality, we are concerned with the process by which a person arrived at his 
ideas. We cannot observe this process directly; we cannot literally see an act of thought 
or evasion in someone else’s mind. But the process is revealed in numerous ways – by 
the kinds of connections a person makes, by his openness to evidence, by his general 
demeanor. One may observe how a person deals with the objections one raises, how 
willing he is to examine the issues in depth, to lay out his reasons for his position. One 
may observe whether a person gets angry when his position is challenged, or relies on the 
cruder sorts of fallacies such as ad hominem or appeal to emotion, or dodges from one 
issue to another in response to objections. These are all signs of non-objectivity. They tell 
one that some motive is at work other than a desire to grasp the facts (Kelley [1990] 
2000: 56). 
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In line with Rand’s acknowledgment that “truly and deliberately evil men are a very small 
minority” (Rand [1966] 1989: 39), Kelley considers it irresponsible to condemn all who err in 
philosophy as irredeemably evil. Because, as Rand went to great lengths to elucidate, the activity 
of thinking is volitional rather than automatic and subject to error rather than infallible, “it is 
perfectly possible to commit errors of thinking because one has not fully mastered the relevant 
skills, or because some complexity in the subject matter makes it difficult to apply the methods 
properly” (Kelley [1990] 2000: 51-52). After all, the philosophical problems with which this 
essay is concerned are problems that have occupied the minds of countless thinkers. To assume 
that mistakes made along the way invariably indicate immorality would be downright silly. 
This difference between evil and error is important to stress here because this is precisely the 
difference that I maintain separates Barthes and Derrida. In the previous section, I argued that 
Barthes was a moral criminal. In this section, I will argue that Derrida is a moral coward. Unlike 
Barthes, who was driven by a Nietzschean “will to power,” that which drives Derrida is what 
Cavell calls a fantasy of necessary inexpressiveness, a fantasy “in which I am not merely 
unknown but in which I am powerless to make myself known” (Cavell 1979: 351). It was 
against powerlessness that Barthes was fighting in “The Death of the Author,” it was the very 
idea of being powerless that frightened Barthes and fueled his irrational and immoral quest for 
omnipotence. Derrida, by contrast, finds solace in the idea of powerlessness as a (paradoxically 
powerful) force capable of annulling his responsibility and accountability as a human being alive 
in and to the world. Discernible in the fantasy of necessary inexpressiveness is what both Rand 
and Cavell have discussed as the fear that drives skepticism.23 It is also, as I will endeavor to 
prove in this section, the fear that drives Derrida’s practice of deconstruction. 
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The “origin” of deconstruction can be traced back to Derrida’s early engagements with the 
phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Indeed, it is not overstating the case to equate the Derridean 
practice of deconstruction with the Husserlian practice of conducting “sense-investigations.” In 
his introduction to his translation of Husserl’s essay “The Origin of Geometry,” Derrida 
identifies as the “main find” of his translation the presence of a “spiraling movement” in 
Husserlian sense-investigations which he argues points the way towards the “new form of 
radicality” he would eventually call deconstruction:
Concerning the intentional history of a particular eidetic science, a sense-investigation of 
its conditions of possibility will reveal to us exemplarily the conditions and sense of the 
historicity of science in general, then of universal historicity … This would demonstrate, 
if it were still necessary, at what point the juridical order of implications is not so linear 
and how difficult it is to recognize the starting point (Derrida [1962] 1989: 33-34).24
Deconstruction, then, emerges from the fecundity indicated by Husserl of inquiring into the 
“conditions of possibility” for a particular discourse, “continually calling us back to the 
unnoticed presuppositions of ever recurring problems” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 52).25 Added to 
which, deconstruction is more than merely an available option for philosophers; it is, according 
to Derrida, a philosophical necessity insofar as “every critical enterprise” allegedly suffers from a 
“natural naiveté of its language” and thus requires “rigorous philological or ‘etymological’” 
investigation (Derrida [1962] 1989: 69-70).26 In Husserl’s case, his “naiveté” is discernible in his 
“dogmatic” commitment to what Derrida famously termed the metaphysics of presence, a 
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philosophical orientation according to which the “privilege” of presence was not only never put 
into question by Husserl (nor by any other like-minded philosophers going all the way back to 
Aristotle) – “it could not have been” (Derrida [1968a] 1982: 34, my emphasis).27
Derrida’s entire line of argument here corroborates the presence in deconstruction of a fantasy of 
necessary inexpressiveness. At practically every turn, whether in his rare acts of introspection or 
his more frequent acts of extrospection, Derrida adamantly affirms to his readers (and thereby 
reaffirms to himself) that self-consciousness is an illusion, intentionality belongs only to that 
which is not human, and concepts such as responsibility and culpability are utterly superfluous in 
the realm of human existence. How strange it is, then, for poststructuralists to speak of “the 
ethics of deconstruction” (Critchley [1992] 2014) and proclaim that deconstruction “always has 
ethical and political stakes and consequences” (Bowman 2013: 19). If (a) there is no such thing 
as self-consciousness insofar as consciousness is inaccessible to the (non)self that is the human 
subject, and if (b) the consciousness of other human subjects is unknowable insofar as the 
necessary inexpressiveness inherent in language assures either silence or misunderstanding, then 
how is it possible for (a) and (b) to produce a (c) in which ethics is even conceivable? The idea 
of ethical responsibility often affirmed by poststructuralists is valid and noble (and consistent 
with Objectivism), but far from being deconstructionist, does it not fundamentally contradict 
Derrida’s purpose with deconstruction? 
But I am not there yet. Before considering the logical and moral consequences of Derrida’s 
inability to resolve the contradictions at the heart of deconstruction, I want to consider in greater 
detail his critiques of Husserl, and in particular, his attempts to remove the self from 
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consciousness. The ineffectuality of his critiques is attributable to his twin Kantian/Nietzschean 
bias and his consequent inability to apprehend the significance of the primacy of existence in 
Husserlian phenomenology. Interestingly, the axiom “existence exists” and the axiomatic 
concepts of existence, identity, and consciousness anchor phenomenology just as they anchor 
Objectivism (even if not in these precise Objectivist terms). Husserl also devoted a great deal of 
his energy, just as Rand did after him, to epistemological considerations; i.e., to considerations of 
the means by which human beings use their conceptual faculty to bring the objective, external 
world into the realm of the knowable.28 Unfortunately, due to his allegiance to Kant, Derrida 
invariably occludes in his critiques of Husserl the important fact that, for Husserl, both “inner” 
existence and “outer” existence are “immediately present” in consciousness (Derrida [1967] 
1973: 43).29 As Vivian Sobchak affirms, according to Husserl, “the condition of being conscious 
of the world is being a consciousness in it” (Sobchak 1992: 59).30 Husserl, for his part, 
formulated his sense of the primacy of existence as follows: 
When, through memories, starting from a perception, I am led back into my own past, 
this past is precisely my own, the past of this same subject who is present and living. And 
the past environing world [Umgebungswelt] which is now remembered belongs to the 
same world as the world in which I now live … To introduce the matter of 
intersubjectivity, what we have said also holds true if another person tells me about his 
past experiences, communicates his memories … The remembered environing world of 
the other, about which he tells us, may certainly be another world than that in which we 
find ourselves at present, and likewise the environing world which I myself remember 
may be another world; I can have changed my place of residence, have come to another 
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country, with other men and other customs, etc., or this same geographical neighborhood 
with its inhabitants may have so changed in the course of a human life that it has simply 
become another; but, despite all this, all these different remembered environing worlds 
are pieces of one and the same objective world. This world is, in the most comprehensive 
sense, as the life-world for a human community capable of mutual understanding, our 
Earth (Husserl [1948] 1973: 162-163). 
Objectivity is clearly an important concept for Husserl. As Derrida puts it in his introduction to 
“The Origin of Geometry,” Husserl “repeatedly and obstinately” returns to the question of 
objectivity (Derrida [1962] 1989: 63). Despite his ability to register the importance of objectivity 
in Husserlian phenomenology, Derrida’s reliance on the intrinsic/subjective dichotomy leads to a 
grotesque distortion of the concept. In one of his earliest engagements with Husserlian 
phenomenology, Derrida characterizes the phenomenologist in search of objectivity as “the ‘true 
positivist’ who returns to the things themselves and who is self-effacing before the originality 
and primordiality of meanings” (Derrida [1959] 2001: 194). The point to be made in response to 
this nonsensical characterization is that the notion of effacing oneself is phenomenologically 
unthinkable inasmuch as it contradicts, in favor of the mystical “logic” that underpins 
intrinsicism, what Husserl calls the “necessary regress to the ego” in all sense-investigations 
(Husserl [1931] 1960: 6). 
Now, to be fair to Derrida, his ill-advised recourse to the intrinsic/subjective dichotomy may 
have seemed the only option available to him given Husserl’s own occasional confusion as to the 
means by which objectivity is epistemologically assured. For example, in his Formal and 
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Transcendental Logic, Husserl asserts the following pertaining to his method of sense-
investigation:  
We must place ourselves above this whole life and all this cultural tradition and, by 
radical sense-investigations, seek for ourselves singly and in common the ultimate 
possibilities and necessities, on the basis of which we can take our position toward 
actualities in judging, valuing, and acting. True, in that manner we gain nothing but 
universalities for which we can give an ultimate accounting … whereas life, after all, 
consists in decisions of the “moment,” which never has time to establish anything with 
scientific rationality (Husserl [1929] 1969: 5-6). 
Even though Husserl sought to move beyond the errors committed by Descartes in his quest for 
“scientific rationality,” he is here committing a number of the very same errors.31 The first and 
most serious error is discernible in the nonsensical impulse to place oneself “above” life. This 
impulse is eminently Cartesian; it betrays a mystical desire for knowledge to be revealed rather 
than produced. Rand points out that this mystical desire rests on “the unchallenged premise that 
any knowledge acquired by a process of consciousness is necessarily subjective and cannot 
correspond to the facts of reality, since it is ‘processed knowledge’” – this despite the fact that 
“processed knowledge” is a pleonasm, for “all knowledge is processed knowledge – whether on 
the sensory, perceptual, or conceptual level. An ‘unprocessed’ knowledge would be a knowledge 
acquired without means of cognition” (Rand [1966-1967]: 1990: 81).  
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In addition to this Cartesian error, Husserl also reifies a split between “theoretical” knowledge 
and “practical” knowledge. For Husserl, theoretical knowledge is rational, measured, and 
objective; it yields “universalities.” Practical knowledge, on the other hand, is…what? Irrational? 
Unmeasured? Subjective? Husserl’s incoherence in speaking of “decisions of the ‘moment’” as 
somehow unreachable by rationality – thereby implying that rationality and practicality are 
mutually exclusive – is a holdover from the “contemptible breed” of mystics described by Rand 
as follows: 
[They] profess a devotion to some sort of “pure knowledge” – the purity consisting of 
their claim that such knowledge has no practical purpose … [and they] reserve their logic 
for inanimate matter [since they] believe that the subject of dealing with men requires and 
deserves no rationality … [But] since there is no such thing as “non-practical knowledge” 
or any sort of “disinterested” action, since they scorn the use of their science for the 
purpose and profit of life, they deliver their science to the service of death (Rand 1957: 
1066). 
Considering Husserl’s confusion vis-à-vis the intrinsic/subjective dichotomy, Derrida is right to 
apply pressure to the contradictions that undermine Husserlian objectivity. Derrida formulates 
Husserl’s quest for objectivity as the attempt to “give rise” to an object that satisfies the criteria 
of “omnitemporal validity, universal normativity, intelligibility for ‘everyone,’ uprootedness out 
of all ‘here and now’ factuality, and so forth,” and this quest, as Derrida understands it, hinges 
on the answer provided to the question of how consciousness can “go out of itself in order to 
encounter or constitute the object” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 63). While Derrida is right to maintain 
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Husserl’s Cartesian confusion vis-à-vis consciousness going “out of itself,” he inadvertently 
introduces even more confusion with two additional philosophical errors. The first error is 
Kantian in nature and is discernible in his equivocation between encountering an object and 
constituting an object, the two of which indicate precisely the difference between objectivity and 
subjectivity. The second error, meanwhile, is Cartesian in nature, and it is discernible in the 
following crucial part of Derrida’s critique:
No doubt geometrical truth is beyond every particular and factual linguistic hold as such, 
one for which every subject speaking a determined language and belonging to a 
determined cultural community is in fact responsible. But the objectivity of this truth 
could not be constituted without the pure possibility of an inquiry into a pure language in 
general. Without this pure and essential possibility, the geometrical formation would 
remain ineffable and solitary. Then it would be absolutely bound to the psychological life 
of a factual individual, to that of a factual community, indeed to a particular moment of 
that life. It would become neither omnitemporal nor intelligible for all. It would not be 
what it is. Whether geometry can be spoken about is not, then, the extrinsic and 
accidental possibility of a fall into the body of speech or of a slip into a historical 
movement. Speech is no longer simply the expression of what, without it, would already 
be an object: caught again in its primordial purity, speech constitutes the object and is a 
concrete juridical condition of truth. The paradox is that, without the apparent fall back 
into language and thereby into history, a fall which would alienate the ideal purity of 
sense, sense would remain an empirical formation imprisoned as fact in a psychological 
subjectivity – in the inventor’s head (Derrida [1962] 1989: 76-77). 
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Beyond his Kantian confusion and the persistence of the intrinsic/subjective dichotomy, evident 
in this passage is an additional Cartesian confusion vis-à-vis Derrida’s bizarre conception of 
language as an all-powerful causal agent that makes meaning and “always-already” thwarts 
human autonomy after the fashion of Descartes’ evil demon. There is the presumption in 
Derrida’s conception of language that, as Noël Carroll puts it, if human thought and action have 
“structural conditions,” then these conditions are constraints, they are inimical to human 
autonomy. But Carroll observes how strange it is to think of these conditions of possibility as 
conditions of impossibility, for without these conditions, “nothing could be said, which would in 
fact be a real blow to the possibility of human autonomy” (Carroll 1988b: 78-79). More radical 
than Barthes’ conception of the “pure” functionality of language, Derrida seems to hold that 
language is not just autonomous and omnipotent but malevolent to boot. The problem, then, is 
Derrida’s conception of freedom, which, as Carroll argues, is “too extravagant”:
This argument seems to presuppose that no speaking subject is free unless it creates the 
language it speaks. But this is absurd. If I have a hammer and I can use it to build a 
house, or a hobby horse, or simply use it to pound the ground, then it seems to me that I 
am free in what I hammer. And if I hammered someone who annoyed me – while 
certifiably sane – I would be responsible for my act since it was free. But [Derrida’s] 
argument, by logical analogy, would have it that I am not free because I did not invent 
hammers. This idea of freedom, however, is unacceptably exorbitant, and any argument 
that uses it as a standard of what freedom is is unsound (Carroll 1988b: 78). 
35 
If Derrida simply held the mistaken belief that language is not a “tool” that we “use” to 
“communicate” but an all-powerful force that uses us, then dissolving such a silly philosophical 
worry would be simple enough. The difficulty in dissolving Derrida’s philosophical worry is due 
to his motivation in clinging to such a silly belief – which, as I mentioned at the start of this 
section, is his fear of the responsibility and accountability that comes with being human.32
Responsibility, to Derrida, means “shouldering a word one hears spoken, as well as taking on 
oneself the transfer of sense, in order to look after its advance” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 143). This 
responsibility is what Derrida has in mind when he confesses that “speaking frightens me” 
(Derrida [1964] 2001: 9); it is what motivates him to mobilize a nonsensical conception of 
language that, in his fantasy, “restricts meaning – and our responsibility for it” (Derrida [1964] 
2001: 9, my emphasis). And Derrida’s “solution,” in the form of his quasi-Cartesian conception 
of language, is meant to ensure that “no intention can ever be fully conscious, or actually present 
to itself” (Derrida [1977] 1988: 73), which would mean, fulfilling Derrida’s fantasy of necessary 
inexpressiveness, that language “leaves us no choice but to mean (to say) something that is 
(already, always, also) other than what we mean (to say), to say something other than what we 
say and would have wanted to say” (Derrida [1977] 1988: 62).
This fantasy of necessary inexpressiveness would, I admit, be a neat solution to the problems of 
consciousness and the issue of responsibility, and for many scholars who have followed in 
Derrida’s wake, it has proven to be a satisfactory solution. Paul de Man, for instance, rejects on 
Derridean grounds the postulation of a “happy relationship” between consciousness and the 
external world since “the very fact that the relationship has to be established within the medium 
of language indicates that it does not exist in actuality” (de Man [1960] 1984: 8). John Mowitt, 
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meanwhile, rejects in the realm of art the concept of value since it presupposes not only that 
there are objective attributes identifiable in artworks, but even more affrontingly, that artworks 
have, “presumably by virtue of their ‘natures,’ clear and distinct insides” immune to the 
“tenacious heterogeneity” of textual discursivity (Mowitt 1992: 215). And Paul Bowman rejects 
the concept of objective meaning since the invocation of objectivity “is enabled by something 
like a second ‘structure,’ one that is never fully knowable” (Bowman 2007: 64). Yet, despite the 
neatness of this solution, it is ultimately untenable. To prove this, it will be instructive to 
consider in detail the ubiquitous contradictions that prevent Derrida from ever actually indulging 
in his fantasy of necessary inexpressiveness. And, intriguingly enough, these contradictions are 
the clearest and most persistent in Derrida’s attempts to move from his general philosophy of 
deconstruction to a deconstructive aesthetics.  
After completing a dissertation on Husserlian phenomenology in 1954, Derrida set out, in 1957, 
to write a thesis on “the ideality of the literary object.”33 That thesis was never written, but as J. 
Hillis Miller convincingly argues, the ideas that motivated Derrida in his consideration of such a 
project underwrite his deconstructive aesthetics; they are everywhere, “from one end to the other 
of his work” (Miller 2001: 58). One of the earliest places where they emerge is in his 1964 essay 
“Force and Signification.” In this essay, Derrida explores such issues in the philosophy of art as 
artistic inspiration and creation, the ontology of literature, the vicissitudes of interpretation, and 
problems of evaluation, and he does so on the basis, primarily, of a critique of the literary 
criticism of Jean Rousset. According to Derrida, Rousset exemplifies in the philosophy of art the 
tendency to uncritically and dogmatically adhere to the metaphysics of presence and idealize the 
artistic object. Indicating the centrality of his critiques of Husserl to his deconstructive aesthetics, 
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Derrida has in mind when speaking of the idealization of the artistic object the Husserlian 
idealization of mathematics. In his introduction to “The Origin of Geometry,” Derrida identifies 
“the mathematical object” as “the privileged example and most permanent thread guiding 
Husserl’s reflection.” The privilege and permanence of the mathematical object in Husserlian 
phenomenology is, according to Derrida, attributable to its ideality, to its being “thoroughly 
transparent and exhausted by its phenomenality”; as an “absolutely objective” object, it is, at its 
most ideal, “totally rid of empirical subjectivity” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 27). 
It is this form of Husserlian ideality that Derrida detects in Rousset’s “ultrastructuralism,” which 
he argues has the dangerous effect of cutting off from criticism the necessary “attentiveness to 
the internal historicity of the work itself,” including its relationship to a “subjective origin” 
(Derrida [1964] 2001: 15). By deploying the concept of “origin,” Derrida appears to be 
contradicting his stated aim in his introduction to “The Origin of Geometry” to dispense with 
what he refers to as the “mythology of the absolute beginning” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 69). To 
avoid erroneous claims of contradiction, it must be clarified that Derrida is here invoking a 
modified conception of “origin” based on the following explanation provided by Husserl as to 
the trajectory of his sense-investigation into the origins of geometry: 
The question of the origin of geometry (under which title here, for the sake of brevity, we 
include all disciplines that deal with shapes existing mathematically in pure space-time) 
shall not be considered here as the philological-historical question, i.e., as the search for 
the first geometers who actually uttered pure geometrical propositions, proofs, theories, 
or for the particular propositions they discovered, or the like. Rather than this, our interest 
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shall be the inquiry back into the most original sense in which geometry once arose, was 
present as the tradition of millennia, is still present for us, and is still being worked on in 
a lively forward development; we inquire into that sense in which it appeared in history 
for the first time – in which it had to appear, even though we know nothing of the first 
creators and are not even asking after them (Husserl [1939] 1970: 354, my emphasis). 
Following Husserl, Derrida further clarifies his conception of “origin” in the following manner:
It is not at all a question of determining what in fact were the first acts, the first 
experiences, the first geometers who were in fact responsible for the advent of geometry. 
Such a determination, even if possible, would flatter our historical curiosity … [and] a 
certain ‘romanticism’ … but even if, at its limit, this determination would embrace all the 
historical facts that have constituted the empirical milieu for truth’s founding, it would 
still leave us blind about the very sense of such a founding: a sense that is necessary and 
compared to which these facts have at best only an exemplary signification (Derrida 
[1962] 1989: 37-38). 
If this explains what Derrida means by “origin,” it remains to be explained what he means by 
subjective origin. If the “subjective origin” of geometry is not traceable to the “primally 
instituting geometer” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 100), then the “subjective origin” of an artwork 
should not be traceable to its “author.”34 Indeed, according to the terms of Derrida’s critique of 
Rousset’s “ultrastructuralism,” the very notion of a “center” or “ground” for the meaning of an 
artwork is anathema to his deconstructive aesthetics. This may be corroborated by considering 
39 
Derrida’s critique of Rousset in light of his subsequent critique of the structural anthropology of 
Claude Lévi-Strauss, in which Derrida focuses on the problematic concept of the “center” that is 
presupposed in the concept of structure:  
The function of [the] center [is] not only to orient, balance, and organize the structure –
one cannot in fact conceive of an unorganized structure – but above all to make sure that 
the organizing principle of the structure would limit what we might call the play of the 
structure … The concept of centered structure is in fact the concept of a play based on a 
fundamental ground, a play constituted on the basis of a fundamental immobility and a 
reassuring certitude, which itself is beyond the reach of play. And on the basis of this 
certitude, anxiety can be mastered (Derrida [1966] 2001: 352).35
Against the (metaphysical) concept of “structure” and its presupposition of a (Lévi-Straussian) 
“center” or (Husserlian) “ground,” the result of which is, in the “geometrism” of Rousset’s 
criticism, an “ideal” artistic object, Derrida argues for unstructured, ungrounded, decentered 
“play.” Yet, at the beginning of his critique of Rousset, Derrida acknowledges that meaning in 
art “is the author’s responsibility before being the critic’s” (Derrida [1964] 2001: 4). This 
ambivalence regarding the artwork – on the one hand, understood as possessing an “internal 
historicity” and a “subjective origin,” and, on the other hand, understood as “a world of signs 
without fault, without truth, and without origin” (Derrida [1966] 2001: 369) – highlights the 
fundamental contradiction of Derrida’s deconstructive aesthetics, one that he never successfully 
resolves.  
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In “Force and Signification,” Derrida acknowledges the logical priority of authorship in 
criticism. However, in a reading of Franz Kafka’s The Trial (1925), he contradicts this sensible 
position and derides the “law” of authorship and the equally silly belief in objective, 
discoverable meaning.36 Reversing course again, in his critique of Lacan’s reading of Edgar 
Allan Poe’s “The Purloined Letter” (1844), Derrida takes Lacan to task for failing to consider 
Poe’s authorship over the course of his analysis and, for his part, engages in detailed, author-
based criticism.37 Finally, within the space of a single interview, Derrida discusses the authorship 
of James Joyce as an “absolutely singular event,” an absolutely singular “autobiographical 
inscription” in which “historical, theoretical, linguistic, [and] philosophical culture” are 
condensed (Derrida [1989] 1992: 43), yet at the same time maintains that there is an irreducible 
“literary intentionality” that “suspend[s] ‘thetic’ and naive belief in meaning” (Derrida [1989] 
1992: 45). 
Throughout his entire career, Derrida remained tragically torn between two warring conceptions 
of life and art, one in which “the category of intention will not disappear” (Derrida [1972] 1988: 
18) and another where intention disappears in the act of “Logos retaking possession of itself” 
(Derrida [1962] 1989: 146). The significance of the concept of intention (and the concept of 
meaning necessarily implied) is made explicit in Derrida’s defense, in response to the criticisms 
of John Searle, of his concept of “iterability”38: 
If the law of iterability, with all its associated laws, exceeds the intentional structure that 
it renders possible and whose teleo-archaeology it limits … then the question of the 
specificity of intentionality in this field without limit remains open: what is
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intentionality? What does “intention” properly mean as the particular or original work 
(mise en oeuvre) of iterability? I admit that this enigma grows increasingly obscure for 
me. It communicates with the greatest questions of being, of meaning and of the 
phenomenon, of consciousness, of the relation to the object in general, of transcendence 
and of appearing as such, etc … [which] only cause[s] my uncertainty to increase, as well 
as my distrust of this word or of this figure, I hardly dare to say “concept” (Derrida 
[1988] 1988: 130). 
This passage indicates the logical and moral consequences, in life and art, of the confusions and 
contradictions regarding objectivity, consciousness, and intention that I have been discussing in 
Derrida’s philosophical practice. The notion that iterability “renders possible” and “limits” the 
concept of intention follows from Derrida’s quasi-Cartesian conception of language as the 
condition of possibility and impossibility of human autonomy. Furthermore, Derrida’s “glass 
half empty” approach to iterability as the condition of impossibility of human autonomy 
confirms for Derrida that intention can never be “fully conscious” or “actually present to itself.” 
The fact that Derrida was never able to actually indulge in this fantasy of necessary 
inexpressiveness is due to his recognition (acknowledged in moments of courage, denied in 
moments of fear) of the following unfortunate consequences:  
1) If intention can never be “fully conscious,” then ethics, responsibility, authorship – in short, 
all concepts that are predicated on human beings as conscious, volitional entities – are null and 
void.39
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2) If ethics and responsibility are not valid concepts, then deconstruction loses its sense and 
purpose.40
3) If authorship is not a valid concept, then the concept of meaning in art loses its sense and 
purpose.41
Even though Derrida was never able to successfully resolve these contradictions, he did 
acknowledge near the end of his life, with disarming sincerity, the problematic ubiquity in his 
work of contradictions. In his last interview, conducted mere weeks before his death, Derrida 
stated the following: 
It is true, I am at war with myself, and you have no idea to what extent, more than you 
can guess, and I say things that contradict each other, that are, let’s say, in real tension 
with each other, that compose me, that make me live, and that will make me die. This 
war, I see it sometimes as a terrifying and painful war, but at the same time I know that it 
is life … [Deconstruction thus] proceeds with me from an unconditional affirmation of 
life … [it] is not death-oriented, just the opposite, it is the affirmation of someone living 
who prefers living, and therefore survival, to death (Derrida 2004: 12). 
In light of this admirably honest and heartfelt confession from Derrida, which depicts nothing if 
not a man tortured by his own fears and inadequacies yet unwilling to acquiesce to nihilism, is 
Jonathan Culler’s characterization of deconstruction not profoundly – even shockingly –
insulting? 
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[Deconstruction] cannot be brought together in a coherent synthesis. For this reason, it 
may not seem [valid] to many, who would argue that logic forbids [contradiction] ... The 
objection to this double procedure [invokes] ... physical and empirical inappropriateness: 
deconstruction’s procedure is called “sawing off the branch on which one is sitting.” This 
may be, in fact, an apt description of the activity, for though it is unusual and somewhat 
risky, it is manifestly something one can attempt. One can and may continue to sit on a 
branch while sawing it ... The question then becomes whether one will succeed in sawing 
it clear through, and where and how one might land ... If “sawing off the branch on which 
one is sitting” seems foolhardy to men of common sense, it is not so for Nietzsche, Freud, 
Heidegger, and Derrida; for they suspect that if they fall there is no “ground” to hit 
(Culler 1982: 149). 
If, as attested to by Ludwig Wittgenstein, philosophical errors “can be fitted into what [one] 
knows aright” (Wittgenstein [1951] 1969: 11e), then the possibility of a redemptive critique of 
Derrida and deconstruction gains considerable purchase. It is a testament to the degeneracy of 
poststructuralism, however, that the first step in such a rescue effort would have to be to rescue 
Derrida and deconstruction from poststructuralism. After all, given Derrida’s own disposition, 
any poststructuralist with even a passing familiarity with Derrida and his work should find 
horrifying the magnitude of abasement in Culler’s repulsive caricature of deconstruction. First of 
all, the fact that Derrida was unable to bring deconstruction into a “coherent synthesis” and was 
unable to resolve its fundamental contradictions is not, as Culler would have it, an indication of 
its success. This backwards “logic” might fly in reference to Barthes and his desire to “discard” 
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the “old specter” of “logical contradiction” in pursuit of the primordial jouissance of the 
infinitely polysemous text, but it is anathema to Derrida’s lifelong commitment to logic and 
morality.42 Added to which, the characterization of Derrida as gleefully sawing off the branch on 
which he was sitting in a spirit of philosophical anarchy reduces the pathos of his sincere quest 
for knowledge of the world and his place in it to something out of Looney Tunes.43
The fact that, far from precipitating a swarm of scholars rushing to his defense, Culler’s 
explication of deconstruction was accepted by poststructuralists as the authoritative account of 
Derrida and his philosophical practice indicates the staggering amount of work facing anyone 
who wishes to undertake a redemptive critique of deconstruction. First and foremost, it will be 
necessary to dissolve the philosophical worries that led Derrida into philosophical error and that 
are responsible for the contradictions at the heart of deconstruction. To his credit, the path for 
dissolving these philosophical worries, although never followed, was charted by Derrida himself 
in his moments of courage. As he once acknowledged, in a decidedly Objectivist spirit, it is 
essential that one lives according to a logic of “all or nothing”:
Every concept that lays claim to any rigor whatsoever implies the alternative of “all or 
nothing” … Even the concept of [for example] relativity is, qua concept, determined 
according to the logic of all or nothing, of yes or no … It is impossible or illegitimate to 
form a philosophical concept outside this logic … [and] whenever one feels obliged to 
stop doing this (as happens to me when I speak of différance, of mark, of supplement, of 
iterability, and of all they entail), it is better to make explicit in the most conceptual, 
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rigorous, formalizing, and pedagogical manner possible the reasons one has for doing so 
(Derrida [1988] 1988: 116-117). 
Strangely enough, the logic of all or nothing to which Derrida aspired with deconstruction is 
precisely the logic of Objectivism: 
Man cannot survive except by gaining knowledge, and reason is his only means to gain it. 
Reason is the faculty that perceives, identifies, and integrates the material provided by his 
senses. The task of his senses is to give to him the evidence of existence, but the task of 
identifying it belongs to his reason … His means [of identification] is logic, and logic … 
is the art of non-contradictory identification … No concept man forms is valid unless he 
integrates it without contradiction into the total sum of his knowledge. To arrive at a 
contradiction is to confess an error in one’s thinking; to maintain a contradiction is to 
abdicate one’s mind and to evict oneself from the realm of reality (Rand 1957: 1016-
1017). 
Cavell once characterized skepticism as the history of one’s turnings, “in distraction or denial,” 
from reality (Cavell [1971] 1979: 114). Analogously, deconstruction serves as the history of 
Derrida’s turnings from reality. For giving in to fear and continually turning from reality, Derrida 
paid the price that all skeptics are forced to pay, the price of, in Cavell’s terminology, “living 
one’s skepticism”:
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In saying that we live our skepticism, I mean to register [an] ignorance about our 
everyday position … Not that we positively know that we are never, or not ordinarily, in 
best cases for knowing … but that we are rather disappointed in our occasions for 
knowing, as though we have, or have lost, some picture of what knowing … would really 
come to – a harmony, a concord, a union, a transparence, a governance, a power – against 
which our actual successes at knowing, and being known, are poor things. To say that 
there is a skepticism which is produced [not just] by a doubt about whether we can know 
[but also] by a disappointment over knowledge itself, and to say that this skepticism is 
lived … is to say that this disappointment has a history (Cavell 1979: 440).
It is on the basis of this picture of the skeptic as doubtful, fearful, and perpetually disappointed in 
his attempts to alleviate his doubts and fears that D.N. Rodowick makes the case that what 
philosophy requires is not further conceptual fine-tuning – which was Derrida’s proposed 
solution with his array of idiosyncratic concepts – but rather a “diagnosis or etiology” of the 
reasons one is compelled to turn from reality (Rodowick 2015: 201). If there exists anything in 
the philosophy of art that proves Rodowick’s contention, it is the philosophical practice of 
deconstruction as it was developed and practiced by Jacques Derrida. 
4. Conclusion 
In this essay, I have framed my elephantine endeavor as a Dante-esque descent into the 
poststructuralist Inferno. However, by way of a conclusion, I think it is important to stress that, 
from a certain Objectivist perspective (similar to the Objectivist distinction between evil and 
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error stressed in the previous section), the fact that contemporary art criticism has accepted the 
aesthetic principles of poststructuralism is not proof of scholars’ “essential evil”; rather, it is “a 
great and tragic proof of [their] essential morality” (Rand [1943] 1995: 87-88), of their 
willingness to always consider alternative methodologies and constantly “check their premises.” 
This determination on the part of scholars to be wary of error, ignorance, prejudice, etc., is not a 
vice. In fact, it is a virtue. However, it is important for scholars to be vigilant regarding what 
Rand called the “dangerous little catch-phrase” of “keeping an open mind,” for as she warned:
This is a very ambiguous term – as demonstrated by a man who once accused a famous 
politician of having “a wide open mind.” That term is an anti-concept: it is usually taken 
to mean an objective, unbiased approach to ideas, but it is used as a call for perpetual 
skepticism, for holding no firm convictions and granting plausibility to anything … What 
objectivity and the study of philosophy require is not an “open mind” but an active mind
… An active mind does not grant equal status to truth and falsehood, it does not remain 
floating forever in a stagnant vacuum of neutrality and uncertainty; by assuming the 
responsibility of judgment, it reaches firm convictions and holds to them … If you keep 
an active mind, you will discover (assuming that you started with common sense 
rationality) that every challenge you examine will strengthen your convictions, that the 
conscious, reasoned rejection of false theories will help you to clarify and amplify the 
true ones, that your ideological enemies will make you invulnerable by providing 
countless demonstrations of their own impotence. No, you will not have to keep your 
mind eternally open to the task of examining every new variant of the same old 
falsehoods. You will discover that they are variants or attacks on certain philosophical 
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essentials – and that the entire, gigantic battle of philosophy (and of human history) 
revolves around the upholding or the destruction of these essentials (Rand [1974b] 1982: 
21-22). 
Proceeding from the notion of the sanction of the victim, it is one of the principles of Objectivism 
that “there comes a point in the defeat of any man of virtue when his own consent is needed for 
evil to win” (Rand 1957: 1048). If, in Randian terms, the gigantic battle of the philosophy of art 
revolves around upholding or destroying the concept of authorship, then it is not possible for the 
concept of authorship to be destroyed unless those committed to upholding it sanction its 
destruction. Arguments against authorship are, in and of themselves, harmless. Only when they 
are given the sanction of reason do they become dangerous. As Rand made clear, a basic premise 
is “an absolute that permits no cooperation with its antithesis and tolerates no tolerance” (Rand 
1957: 741-742). As it relates to art criticism, any scholar who accepts the denial of the basic 
premise of authorship is guilty of “granting the sanction of reason to formal dementia” and “it is 
they who achieve the destruction of the mind” (Rand 1957: 741).
It is undeniable that the morass of contemporary art criticism makes it difficult to envision a 
change in course. But it is important to acknowledge two facts: First, that change is possible; 
second, that silence is sanction. To reverse the tide of irrationality in contemporary art criticism 
and to establish a solid foundation on which to construct an Objectivist aesthetics, scholars must 
build up their endurance, exercise their patience, and refute the unreadable. Only then will the 
roads be clear and will we be able to go back to the world of art.  
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NOTES 
For providing generous encouragement and insightful criticism throughout the writing process, I 
would like to thank Paul Bowman and Evelina Kazakevičiūtė.
1 For examples of his propensity for combat metaphors, see Aristotle ([350 BC] 1995: 566, 1654, 
4680, 4697). 
2 Beyond the work of Leonard Peikoff (1991) and Allan Gotthelf (2000), both of whom seemed 
to discuss aesthetics solely for the sake of comprehensiveness, the only substantial writing on 
Objectivist aesthetics has been the work of Louis Torres and Michelle Marder Kamhi (2000). 
This lacuna has only recently been addressed, first in the “Aesthetics Symposium” in Volume 2 
Number 2 (2001) of this journal, which essentially served as a series of responses to Torres and 
Kamhi’s work, and subsequently in the promising work of Kirsti Minsaas (2000, 2004, 2005, 
2007), Stephen Cox (2000, 2004), and Roger E. Bissell (2002, 2004). There is perhaps a 
correlation between the sparseness of scholarship on Rand’s aesthetic writings and the sparseness 
of Rand’s writings themselves. Cox characterizes Rand’s philosophical musings on aesthetics as 
less than a true aesthetic system and more on the level of gathering the conceptual building 
materials necessary for sustained aesthetic inquiry; in The Art of Fiction ([1958] 2000), a 
collection of lectures transcribed, collated, and published posthumously, and The Romantic 
Manifesto ([1969] 1975), a collection of essays edited together and published by Rand herself, 
Rand is concerned with inventorying the conceptual material she considered vital in aesthetic 
inquiry, some of which she “organized and began to shape” but most of which she “simply 
checked off on her inventory list” (Cox 2004: 67). In a similar vein, Peikoff views Rand’s 
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aesthetic inventory as providing “merely a lead to some broad aesthetic principles [that] would 
have to be applied specifically to the major arts” (Peikoff 1991: 447). This essay will hopefully 
encourage more scholars to apply Objectivist principles to the major arts and to defend the major 
arts from the myriad irrational/immoral principles that have been destroying art criticism for 
decades. 
3 At one point in a discussion of metaphysics, Rand explained her “razor” as follows: “In an ideal 
Atlantis, every philosopher would be asked to name his axioms before being permitted to utter a 
proposition” (Rand [1966-1967] 1990: 251). 
4 I should mention that, in what follows, I will be working exclusively from the most famous 
English translations of Barthes’ and Derrida’s texts. If scholars wish to impugn my arguments on 
the grounds that I am not engaging with the original French texts, then it is their burden to prove 
that the nonsense critiqued in this essay is limited only to the English translations.  
5 In literary theory, Barthes’ essay disturbed the semblance of peace that had been achieved 
following the publication of Monroe C. Beardsley and W.K. Wimsatt Jr.’s controversial essay on 
“the intentional fallacy” (Beardsley and Wimsatt Jr. 1946). In a sense, Barthes’ position 
represents a radicalization of what is known in literary theory as “New Criticism,” which, to 
Barthes’ mind, failed in its attempts to invalidate the concept of authorship and instead did “no 
more than consolidate it” (Barthes [1967] 1977: 143). Barthes’ radicalism was embraced, with 
varying degrees of extremism, by countless literary theorists, notably those associated with the 
French publications Communications and Tel Quel and with what eventually came to be known 
as the “Yale School” of literary criticism. It inspired Jean-Louis Baudry to attempt to explode the 
temporal logic of writing and reading and reconceive them as “merely simultaneous moments in 
a single process of production” (Baudry quoted in Rodowick [1988] 1994: 28); it inspired 
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Terence Hawkes to reject as “dishonest” all criticism “based on the supposition that the [artwork] 
exists in some objective, concrete way before the critical act” (Hawkes 1977: 155) and to
imperiously affirm in place of such criticism a mode of reading that “tears away the veil” of 
authorship based on the supposition that the artwork “remains genuinely ours to make and to 
remake as we please” (Hawkes 1977: 73); and it inspired J. Hillis Miller to proclaim that 
authorial intention can never be “wholly explained, after the fact, by however exhaustive a 
retrospective repertory of [artworks], including the psychobiographies of the authors in question” 
and to encourage instead an emphasis on “the residue of the unexplained” (Miller 1998: 85). 
Film scholars, too, were swept up by the radical spirit of Barthes’ essay, particularly those 
associated with the famous French film journal Cahiers du Cinéma in the late 1960s/early 1970s 
and with the influential British journal Screen in the 1970s and into the 1980s. It inspired critic-
filmmaker Jacques Rivette to urge filmmakers and filmgoers alike to renounce “all the bourgeois 
aesthetic clichés: like the idea that there is an auteur of the film, expressing himself” (Rivette 
[1968] 1986: 319); it inspired Jean Narboni to champion a criticism that deprives films of “the 
author, the Creator, the ‘temperament’ through which Nature must be seen” (Narboni [1970] 
1990: 151); and it inspired Stephen Heath to denounce the notion of an “englobing 
consciousness” capable of intending/being responsible for the particular “articulation of the film 
text” (Heath 1973b: 89). These are merely choice examples of nonsense meant to illuminate the 
logical consequences of embracing the aesthetic principles of poststructuralism.  
6 It is interesting to note that Austin’s philosophical practice aligns perfectly with the 
philosophical method prescribed by Ludwig Wittgenstein: “Most of the [questions] to be found 
in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently, we cannot give any answer 
to questions of this kind, but can only point out that they are nonsensical … [Thus,] the correct 
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method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be 
[sensibly] said … and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something [nonsensical], to 
demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a [sensible] meaning to certain signs in his 
propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person – he would not have the 
feeling that we were teaching him philosophy – this method would be the only strictly correct 
one” (Wittgenstein [1921] 2001: 22-23 [4.003], 89 [6.53]). More interesting still, both Austin’s 
and Wittgenstein’s positions on philosophical argumentation are also similar to the practice of 
what Rand referred to as philosophical detection (Rand [1974b] 1982). The unifying theme is the 
idea that it is possible to discover “the fundamental premises that underlie and shape men’s 
statements on intellectual issues” (Peikoff [1981] 1993: 12). 
7 Even though Barthes is content to leave his distinction between deciphering and disentangling 
poetically vague, the implication, if not convincing, is at least clear: Since, without an author to 
“authorize” its meaning, a text can no longer be said to “have” (a) meaning, it is less like a 
“message” and more like, as Barthes claims, “the thread of a stocking,” which can be “followed” 
or “run” – in a word, disentangled – but “beneath” which “there is nothing” to decipher (Barthes 
[1967] 1977: 147). That this formulation entails a significant reconceptualization of what art is 
and what an artwork does is an issue that, while beyond the scope of this essay, at least warrants 
mentioning. 
8 The two most relevant writings regarding Barthes’ conception of a hedonistic aesthetics are 
“From Work to Text” (Barthes [1971] 1977) and The Pleasure of the Text ([1973] 1975). For a 
brief description of the Nietzschean “ideal” manifest in Barthes’ hedonistic aesthetics, consider 
the following passage: “There exists a pleasure of the work … but this pleasure, no matter how 
keen … [remains] a pleasure of consumption; for if I can read [certain] authors, I also know that 
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I cannot re-write them … As for the Text, it is bound to jouissance, that is to a pleasure without 
separation” (Barthes [1971] 1977: 164). As for the stakes of pursuing this “pleasure without 
separation,” Barthes is admirably clear with respect to how thoroughly it separates him from 
reality: “Imagine someone (a kind of Monsieur Teste in reverse) who abolishes within himself all 
barriers, all classes, all exclusions, not by syncretism but by simple discard of that old specter: 
logical contradiction; who mixes every language, even those said to be incompatible; who 
silently accepts every charge of illogicality, of incongruity … Such a man would be the mockery 
of our society: court, school, asylum, polite conversation would cast him out: who endures 
contradiction without shame? Now this anti-hero exists: he is the reader of the text at the moment 
he takes his pleasure” (Barthes [1973] 1975: 3). In line with the Cavellian notion that one cannot 
just not know that which is known philosophically, I am reminded of a similar sentiment once 
expressed by Wittgenstein: “In certain circumstances a man cannot make a mistake … [which 
means] we should not just not share his opinion: we should regard him as demented” 
(Wittgenstein [1951] 1969: 23e). 
9 The “logic” of Barthes’ arguments here in “The Death of the Author” indicates a significant 
deviation from his earlier work in which authors were acknowledged as individuals possessing 
and capable of acting on conscious intentions. For example, in Writing Degree Zero, Barthes 
claims that the author “shows himself clearly as an individual” in his “choice of” and 
“responsibility for” a “mode of writing.” Indeed, Barthes conceives writing as “the morality of 
form” and he acknowledges, in a curiously Objectivist gesture, that a morality of form 
presupposes volition on the part of the author (Barthes [1953] 2012: 14-16). I will elaborate on 
the moral consequences of Barthes’ arguments in “The Death of the Author,” which deny the 
eminently rational claims for authorship made in Writing Degree Zero, later in this section. 
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10 With reference to the Hegelian Cunning of Reason, Slavoj Žižek seeks to clarify that the 
correct reading “in no way involves a faith in a secret guiding hand” (Žižek 2012: 510). As for 
the insidiousness of language often attributed to Lacan (and endorsed, as I will discuss in the 
next section, by Derrida), Bruce Fink provides a diagrammatically clear explication when he 
alleges that “language ‘lives’ and ‘breathes’ independently of any human subject. Speaking 
beings, far from simply using language as a tool … are the playthings of language, and are duped 
by language” (Fink 1995: 14). Incidentally, I say “attributed to” Lacan rather than “proposed by” 
or “promulgated by” Lacan because, contra Fink, Lacan argues that language is a tool for 
making meaning – or, to use Lacan’s own word, an “instrument” (Lacan [1953] 2006: 227). The 
caveat is that, in Lacanian psychoanalysis, it is the unconscious that is responsible for using 
language to make meaning. That the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious is no less 
mystical than capital-L Language is a fight for another day. The fact remains that, for Lacan, 
language and the unconscious are distinct and it is the latter that uses the former as a meaning-
making instrument. For more on Lacan’s conception of language, see, among his many seminars 
and publications, Lacan ([1953, 1955, 1957, 1958] 2006, [1954-1955] 1991, [1972] 1998). 
11 Oddly enough, despite his allegiance to the semiological principles explicated by Ferdinand de 
Saussure, Barthes is here blatantly contradicting Saussure, who, for his part, maintained 
(sensibly) that “language is not an entity” (Saussure [1916] 2011: 5). In an effort not to 
misrepresent Saussure, I should mention that he does go on to say that, even if formulations such 
as “language does this or that” or “life of language” contradict the facts of reality, one “must not 
go too far” and “require that only words that correspond to the facts” be permitted (Saussure 
[1916] 2011: 5). I would, indeed, go so far as to say – in line with the Wittgensteinian notion of 
philosophy being “a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language” 
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(Wittgenstein [1949] 1967: 47e) – that only words that correspond to the facts ought to be used, 
and if an example is necessary to prove the disastrous consequences of countenancing language 
that contradicts the facts of reality, I shudder to think that there exists a better example than “The 
Death of the Author.”
12 For an even more explicit reliance on authorial intention in Barthes’ critical practice, see his 
classically author-based essay – which, strangely, was written three years after “The Death of the 
Author” and one year before “From Work to Text” and originally published in the famous 
French film journal Cahiers du Cinéma at the height of its militant Marxism – entitled “The 
Third Meaning: Research Notes on Some Eisenstein Stills” (Barthes [1970] 1977), in which 
Barthes claims that the films of Sergei Eisenstein bear his “imperishable signature” (Barthes 
[1970] 1977: 64).   
13 Once again, Barthes is significantly deviating from his earlier work. In Writing Degree Zero, 
Barthes chronicles “the multiplication of modes of writing” (Barthes [1953] 2012: 84) and 
assesses Mallarmé’s artistic practice as merely one mode among many. In “The Death of the 
Author,” however, Mallarmé’s artistic practice is no longer merely one possible mode; it has now 
become the only acceptable mode. I will explain the reason for this shift presently. 
14 The conjunction of authorship and capitalism here reminds me of the famous remark made by 
Walter Benjamin that “capitalism will not die a natural death” (Benjamin [1927-1940] 1999: 
667). 
15 This is confirmed by Barthes, who proudly proclaims that the “poignant self-destruction” of 
such nonsensical artistic endeavors “has the very structure of suicide” (Barthes [1953] 2012: 75).
16 Discerning readers might wonder where Barthes and other proponents of the notions of the 
death/nonexistence of the author and the “pure functionality” of Language stand regarding their 
56 
own writings (or if they even consider writings that bear their names “their” “own”). Robin 
Wood, for example, in a consideration of Stephen Heath’s famous analysis of the Orson Welles 
film, Touch of Evil (1958), highlighted Heath’s condescension regarding film scholars who view 
Welles’ work as a “breathtaking achievement” of “extraordinary” “genius,” yet observed how 
“Heath’s entire article, by the way, has the air of presenting itself as a ‘breathtaking 
achievement,’” a curious glitch in the poststructural matrix that he wryly attempted to explain by 
postulating that “perhaps Heath did not write but was written at that point, i.e., he lapsed into a 
kind of lazy automatic doodling” (Wood [1988] 2002: 17; cf. Heath 1975a, 1975b). Barthes 
himself, meanwhile, in a written forward to an interview for the journal Tel Quel, used the 
strategy of distinguishing “himself” (without offering a positive conception of who/what “he” 
“was”) from both the autobiographical “I,” which “must be taken as if the person speaking were 
the same (in the same place) as the person who had lived,” as well as from “the person whose 
birth date is the same as mine, 12 November 1915,” who/which is “entirely imaginary” (Barthes 
[1971] 1998: 249). However, as once again pointed out by Wood, this strategy of mystification 
“raises more problems than it solves,” for “one has to posit such an intimate connection between 
the [“real”/“imaginary” entities] that we are really back where we started” (Wood [1988] 2002: 
15-16). The most honest way to actively function within this nonsensical realm is exemplified by 
Paul Bowman, who, at the end of his introduction to Mythologies of Martial Arts, a book written 
in an explicitly Barthesian spirit, avers that “every book is incomplete” and that, per Barthes, 
works are “abandoned” by their self-negating, suicidal authors (Bowman 2017: xxiii). While this 
position may be more honest and scrupulous than those of Heath or Barthes himself, it 
nevertheless has its own problems on the order of the altruist conception of authorship and the 
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problematic necessity of such self-sacrifice which it entails. I will elaborate on this problem 
presently. 
17 The fact that it is unclear whether Barthes believes art always was and always will be 
constitutively destructive to authors or whether he believes art is now and should forever be 
approached by authors as a self-destructive practice is a significant and telling equivocation. It is 
on this point that the utility for Barthes of the criticism playbook of Ellsworth Toohey, the villain 
in Rand’s novel The Fountainhead and an exemplar of the altruist (corruption of) morality, 
becomes clear. As Toohey explains at one point in a famous speech: “Empty man’s soul – and 
the space is yours to fill” (Rand [1943] 1994: 666).   
18 Cavell provides a succinct refutation of this ubiquitous package deal: “What is discredited [in 
“The Death of the Author”] is [a straw man], a picture of human creation as a literalized 
anthropomorphism of God’s creation – as if to create [an artwork] I were required to begin with 
the dust of the ground and magic breath” (Cavell [1984] 1988: 111).
19 It warrants mentioning that even poststructuralists who claim to reject the “extreme” terms of 
Barthes’ arguments against authorship still ultimately promulgate the exact terms of and 
conclusions reached in his arguments. Consider, as exemplary of this (foolish at best and 
disingenuous at worst) position, Samuel Weber’s dealings with Barthes in his well-known 
Institution and Interpretation. In his Introduction, Weber acknowledges that “Barthes’ obituary 
has proven premature” (Weber [1987] 2001: xv), yet this does not stop him from repeating 
exactly and on more than one occasion Barthes’ arguments against authorship (presumably 
because he either feels Barthes’ obituary was not premature or because he feels it is his 
responsibility to finish what Barthes started). In a critique of Wolfgang Iser’s The Act of Reading 
(1978), Weber asks the metaphysical nonquestion “Who – or what – controls the text?” (Weber 
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[1987] 2001: 184) and then tries to answer it via package dealing, arguing that “the author” is a 
“secular emanation” of the “Divine Creator” and to that extent “never speaks for itself” (Weber 
[1987] 2001: 196). This despite the facts that (a) authors very often speak for themselves and (b) 
the Author-God is a straw man. 
20 Gone in this passage from “The Death of the Author” is the subtlety of Barthes’ prior 
conceptualizations of the activity of reading. Consider, as an example of Barthes’ transient 
lucidity, the following postulation (in a section significantly titled “Objectivity”) from Criticism 
and Truth: “Nobody has ever denied or will ever deny that the language of the text has a literal 
meaning ... What we need to know is whether or not one has the right to read in this literal 
language other meanings which do not contradict it” (Barthes [1966] 2007: 5-6). Leaving aside 
the irony in the fact that Barthes, in “The Death of the Author,” is doing precisely what he, in 
Criticism and Truth, assured no one will ever do, Barthes’ consideration in Criticism and Truth 
of the ethics of reading is as elegant and rational as it is nuanced and provocative. It is 
unfortunate that the more dramatic and polemical (and less rational and sensible) formulations of 
“The Death of the Author” have sedimented into critical dogma, thereby occluding the far more 
stringent efforts discernible in Barthes’ earlier work.
21 This reversal is even more explicit in “From Work to Text” in which Barthes decrees that “no 
vital ‘respect’ is due to the Text: it can be broken” (Barthes [1971] 1977: 161). Ironically, in a 
consideration of theories of textual analysis in relation to Freudian psychoanalysis, Weber notes 
that “to disfigure a text and to commit a murder” are “similar” acts (Weber [1987] 2001: 76) 
insofar as, in Freudian terms, “the difficulty lies not in the execution of the deed but in the doing 
away with the traces” (Freud [1937] 1939: 70). It would appear that Freud’s perspicuous 
observation did not prevent Barthes (any more than it prevented Weber) from going ahead with 
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his attempted murder, perhaps because he was confident he would be able to do away with the 
traces. 
22 That the romanticism implicit in my critique here becomes explicit must, in the interest of 
space, remain undeveloped. For a more elaborate treatment of romanticism between philosophy 
and art, see Rand ([1969] 1975). Additionally, my emphasis on the concept of acknowledgment 
is meant to indicate on this issue an affinity between Rand and Cavell. For the latter’s many 
considerations of romanticism between philosophy and art (in which acknowledgment is a signal 
concept), see, in particular, Cavell ([1969] 2002, 1979, 1988). 
23 Against skeptics such as Descartes and Kant, Cavell argued, following Austin and 
Wittgenstein, that what he calls “the truth of skepticism” is that, inasmuch as “what skepticism 
questions or denies my knowledge of is the world of objects I inhabit, is the world” (Cavell 
1979: 448), the desire of skeptics to know with certainty the existence of the world paradoxically 
gives ground to “a sense of powerlessness” in the face of “the precariousness and arbitrariness of 
existence, the utter contingency in the fact that things are as they are” (Cavell 1979: 236). On 
this picture, a more accurate name for skepticism presents itself: Fear. Through the act, 
motivated by fear, of sealing off from human knowledge the world in its awe-inspiring 
immediacy and intractability, skeptics create in its place a world that they fancy as subject to 
their whims. The skeptic’s experience of trying to prove that existence exists, moreover, is “one 
of trying to establish an absolutely firm connection with that world-object from that sealed 
position,” a self-defeating task undertaken “as though, deprived of the ordinary forms of life in 
which that connection is, and is alone, secured, [the skeptic] is trying to establish it in his 
immediate consciousness, then and there” (Cavell 1979: 238). Rand, for her part, adds color to 
the picture painted by Cavell of the fear that drives skepticism when she notes that “every form 
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of causeless self-doubt, every feeling of inferiority and secret unworthiness, is, in fact, man’s 
hidden dread of his inability to deal with existence. But the greater his terror, the more fiercely 
he clings to the murderous doctrines that choke him … He will fake, evade, blank out; he will 
cheat himself of reality, of existence, of happiness, of mind; and he will ultimately cheat himself 
of self-esteem by struggling to preserve its illusion rather than to risk discovering its lack … … 
A [skeptic] is a man who surrendered his mind at its first encounter with the minds of others. 
Somewhere in the distant reaches of his childhood, when his own understanding of reality 
clashed with the assertions of others, with their arbitrary orders and contradictory demands, he 
gave in to so craven a fear of independence that he renounced his rational faculty … [That is 
why,] when you listen to a [skeptic’s] harangue on the impotence of the human mind and begin 
to doubt your consciousness, not his, when you permit your precariously semi-rational state to be 
shaken by any assertion and decide it is safer to trust his superior certainty and knowledge, the 
joke is on both of you: your sanction is the only source of certainty he has. The supernatural 
power that a [skeptic] dreads, the unknowable spirit he worships, the consciousness he considers 
omnipotent, is yours” (Rand 1957: 1044, 1057). 
24 Husserl himself stated plainly, inviting someone like Derrida to take the baton, that his own 
sense-investigations were not the only paths available to philosophers: “Other paths are possible 
for sense-investigations with a radical aim” (Husserl [1929] 1969: 7).
25 Derrida is again taking the baton from Husserl: “For a rational practice, theory a priori can be 
only a delimiting form; it can only plant fences, the crossing of which indicates absurdity or 
aberration. What problems arise in this connection for self-education and the education of 
mankind is a separate question; and, by the way, in its universal form, it is itself a question to be 
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dealt with by an all-embracing science, which considers all possibilities and truths” (Husserl 
[1929] 1969: 6). 
26 The appearance here of the word “natural” is very strange considering Derrida’s career-long 
rejection of all such notions as the “natural” or the “given.” For example: “To account for a 
certain stability (by essence always provisional and finite) is precisely not to speak of eternity or 
of absolute solidity; it is to take into account a historicity, a nonnaturalness, of ethics, of politics, 
of institutionality, etc. … I say that there is no stability that is absolute, eternal, intangible, 
natural, etc.” (Derrida [1988] 1988: 151, my emphases). According to Derrida’s own claim that 
“coherence in contradiction expresses the force of a desire” (Derrida [1966] 2001: 352), this 
contradiction expresses the force of Derrida’s desire for necessary inexpressiveness and 
constitutive communicative failure (about which I will have more to say in what follows). 
Additionally, while Derrida’s conception of philological/etymological investigation has a distinct 
Wittgensteinian ring to it, deconstruction, rather than a mere species of grammatical 
investigation, is, if anything, a perversion. For corroboration of this claim, see Cavell ([1983, 
1984, 1986b] 1988, 1985, 1989) and Toril Moi (2009). 
27 The “logic” of Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence is most clearly articulated in 
Of Grammatology ([1967] 1997), in which Derrida explores the work of Saussure and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau and in the process asserts the (paradoxically foundational) importance of such 
concepts as the supplement and the trace, and “Ousia and Grarnmë: Note on a Note from Being 
and Time” ([1968] 1982), in which Derrida explores the work of Aristotle and Martin Heidegger 
and in the process asserts the (paradoxically foundational) importance of such concepts as 
absence and différance. Its affront to logic, meanwhile, is discernible in Derrida’s reliance 
(inherited from Heidegger) on a “vulgar variant” of concept stealing Rand refers to as the 
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reification of the zero: “Observe the fact that in the writings of every school of mysticism and 
irrationalism, amidst all the ponderously unintelligible verbiage of obfuscations, rationalizations, 
and equivocations (which include protestations of fidelity to reason and claims to some ‘higher’ 
form of rationality), one finds, sooner or later, a clear, simple, explicit denial of the validity (of 
the metaphysical or ontological status) of axiomatic concepts, most frequently of ‘identity’ … 
You do not have to guess, infer, or interpret. They tell you. But what you do have to know is the 
full meaning, implications, and consequences of such denials … One of the consequences (a 
vulgar variant of concept stealing, prevalent among avowed mystics and irrationalists) is a 
fallacy I call the reification of the zero. It consists of regarding ‘nothing’ as a thing, as a special, 
different kind of existent. (For example, see Existentialism.) This fallacy breeds such symptoms 
as the notion that presence and absence, or being and non-being, are metaphysical forces of equal 
power” (Rand [1966-1967] 1990: 60). 
28 In his introduction to “The Origin of Geometry,” Derrida incoherently refers to Husserlian 
epistemology as a “secondary grounding” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 54). I say “incoherently refers” 
because grounding is epistemologically irreducible. Grounding is an action performed in and by 
a human consciousness in response to the objective, external world. Derrida seems to think that 
the (allegedly illusory notion of an) objective, external world is itself some sort of mystical 
“grounding” rather than the ground on which a human being grounds himself.  
29 Consider the penultimate sentence in Speech and Phenomena: “Contrary to what 
phenomenology – which is always phenomenology of perception – has tried to make us believe, 
contrary to what our desire cannot fail to be tempted into believing, the thing itself always 
escapes” (Derrida [1967] 1973: 104). The only actual attention Derrida gives to the significance 
in Husserl’s work of the primacy of existence comes in the form of two footnotes in his 
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introduction to “The Origin of Geometry” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 83-85) wherein he casually 
dismisses the primacy of existence – having already come to the conclusion that “delay is the 
philosophical absolute” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 152) and that “the Absolute is present only in 
being deferred-delayed” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 153) – as an allegedly untenable reduction of the 
ontologically constitutive “relativity” supported by his nonsensical metaphysics of différance
(Derrida [1962] 1989: 84; see also Derrida [1968b] 1973).  
30 Allan Casebier adds that “it is characteristic of the Husserlian system that consciousness is 
always consciousness of something” (Casebier 1991: 15). Compare these remarks to the 
Objectivist position according to which “you can become aware of the fact that you are 
conscious” only “after you have become conscious of something,” that only after this point of 
cultivation can a person then “identify the fact that it is some function in [his or her] mind that is 
performing this process of awareness” (Rand [1966-1967] 1990: 246). For Derrida, the very idea 
of an ontological “ground” – let alone an intelligible ontological ground accessible to 
consciousness – is anathema to his Kantian sensibility. He thus rejects the Husserlian notion of 
“original self-evidence” (Husserl [1939] 1970: 365) and, indeed, rejects axiomatic concepts tout 
court. As he puts it in his introduction to “The Origin of Geometry”: “Axiomatics in general 
(from which alone every ideal of exhaustive and exact deductivity can take its sense, from which 
alone every problem of decidability can then spring) already supposes” a “primordial evidence, a 
radical ground which is already past” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 55).
31 Husserl frames his relationship with Descartes in the following manner: “In recent times, the 
longing for a fully alive philosophy has led to many a renaissance. Must not the only fruitful 
renaissance be the one that reawakens the impulse of the Cartesian Meditations: not to adopt 
their content but, in not doing so, to renew with greater intensity the radicalness of their spirit, 
64 
the radicalness of self-responsibility … Must not the demand for a philosophy aiming at the 
ultimate conceivable freedom from prejudice, shaping itself with actual autonomy according to 
ultimate evidences it has itself produced, and therefore absolutely self-responsible – must not this 
demand, instead of being excessive, be part of the fundamental sense of genuine philosophy?” 
(Husserl [1931] 1960: 6). 
32 Interestingly, for as much as Derrida was influenced by Nietzsche’s critique of the self, his 
nihilistic tendencies are fundamentally opposed to Nietzsche’s hedonism and place him closer to 
the nihilistic philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. The relationship between Nietzsche and 
Schopenhauer is complex to say the least (for useful overviews of the complexities of their 
relationship, see, among many others, Grace Neal Dolson [1901] and Steven Bond [2006]). 
Initially devoted to Schopenhauer’s teachings (Nietzsche [1874] 1997: 125-194), Nietzsche 
ultimately repudiated Schopenhauer for his inability to conquer nihilism (Nietzsche [1883-1888] 
1968: 7-82). Even though (as Rand herself observed) Nietzsche’s solution to nihilism in the form 
of hedonism is merely the other side of the same problematic coin (Rand 1964: 10), his critique 
of nihilism is a well-intentioned plea to embrace not just a will to power but a will to life. For 
Schopenhauer, meanwhile, consider as exemplary of his nihilism the following sentiments as 
expressed in The World as Will and Representation: “Whatever one may say, the happiest 
moment of the happy man is the moment of his falling asleep, and the unhappiest moment of the 
unhappy that of his awaking … [Consciousness] would rather have soon made the calculation 
that the business did not cover the cost, for such a mighty effort and struggle with the straining of 
all the powers, under constant care, anxiety, and want, and with the inevitable destruction of 
every individual life, finds no compensation in the ephemeral existence itself, which is so 
obtained, and which passes into nothing in our hands … Accordingly, existence is certainly to be 
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regarded as an error or mistake, to return from which is salvation” (Schopenhauer [1819] 1966: 
578-579, 605). While I believe this connection between Derrida and Schopenhauer is valid and 
salient, it is to Derrida’s credit that, for all of his nihilistic tendencies, he never truly acquiesces 
to nihilism and instead retains throughout his career a certain Nietzschean will to life. 
33 For background on and analysis of this early point in Derrida’s career, see Derrida ([1980] 
1983) and Miller (2001).  
34 The following is arguably Derrida’s most explicit rehearsal of the “question” of the author 
conceived of as the “origin” of meaning: “The play [of the chain of signification] seems 
systematic. But the system here is not, simply, that of the intentions of an author ... the system is 
not primarily that of what someone meant-to-say ... These communications or corridors of 
meaning can sometimes be declared or clarified [by the author] ... Then again, in other cases, 
[the author] can not see the links, can leave them in the shadow or break them up. And yet these 
links go on working of themselves. In spite of him? Thanks to him? In his text? Outside his text? 
But then where? Between his text and the language? For what reader? At what moment? To 
answer such questions in principle and in general will seem impossible; and that will give us the 
suspicion that there is some malformation in the question itself” (Derrida [1972] 1981: 95-96).  
35 The fact that the antipathy to the concept of structure exemplified by Derrida’s critique of 
Lévi-Strauss has structured poststructuralism ever since is one of the many instances where such 
anti-foundationalist thinking proves self-defeating. As Wittgenstein averred: “The game of 
doubting itself presupposes certainty” (Wittgenstein [1951] 1969: 18e) inasmuch as “the 
questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt 
from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn” (Wittgenstein [1951] 1969: 44e). For 
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a more elaborate consideration of this paradox in relation to poststructuralism in particular, see 
Andrew Britton ([1988] 2009). 
36 Derrida’s derision takes the form of a parody of the Declaration of Independence: “We 
presuppose [The Trial], which we hold to be unique and self-identical, to exist as an original 
version … [which] constitutes the ultimate reference for what might be called the legal 
personality of the text, its identity, its unicity, its rights, and so on” (Derrida [1982] 1992: 185).
37 Derrida’s lengthy engagement with Lacan can essentially be split into two halves. In the first 
half, Derrida seeks to bring to light Lacan’s analytical blindspot. According to Derrida, this 
blindspot was inherited from Freud and the dubious practice of “applied psychoanalysis” 
whereby art “is brought into an illustrative position: ‘to illustrate’ here meaning to read the 
general law in the example, to make clear the meaning of a law or of a truth” (Derrida [1972] 
1987: 425-426), which, Derrida charges, merely results in the critic-as-analyst “anticipating the 
truth of the text” and thereby denuding the artwork of its original “semantic material” (Derrida 
[1972] 1987: 415). In the second half, having demonstrated how and where Lacan’s analysis was 
lacking, Derrida sets out to demonstrate and analyze “the recurrence of certain motifs” (such as 
“the letter hanging under the mantel of the fireplace,” which Derrida indicates “has its equivalent 
in ‘The Murders in the Rue Morgue’ [1841]”) in order to better understand “The Purloined 
Letter” both as a unique artwork unto itself, with its own structuring principles, and as part of a 
“textual network” within Poe’s oeuvre (Derrida [1972] 1987: 458). 
38 The infamous clash between Derrida and Searle originated with Searle’s response (Searle 
1977) to Derrida’s critique of Austin (Derrida [1972] 1988), which in turn elicited a borderline 
hysterical response from Derrida (Derrida [1977] 1988). Subsequent to this initial battle, they 
each continued to occasionally and obliquely critique the other (Searle 1983, 2000; Derrida 
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[1988] 1988). In what follows, I will limit my focus to the ramifications of Derrida’s incoherence 
regarding the concept of intention. For more comprehensive contextualization/analysis of the 
terms, stakes, and consequences of this clash, both in relation to Derrida and Searle in particular 
and to deconstruction and ordinary language philosophy more broadly, see, among the many 
commentaries, Jonathan Culler (1982), Christopher Norris (1990), Cavell (1994), Gordon C.F. 
Bearn (1995, 1998), Stephen Mulhall (2001), Leslie Hill (2007), Michael J. Golec (2009), Moi 
(2009), Raoul Moati ([2009] 2014), and Judith Wolfe (2013). 
39 Derrida’s conception of “fully conscious” intention begs a number of questions. For example: 
“Fully” conscious as opposed to what? What is the concept of consciousness with which Derrida 
is working that it makes sensible the postulation of states such as “fully” conscious, “primarily” 
conscious, “slightly” conscious, etc.? What are Derrida’s criteria for determining a given state of 
consciousness? How often does consciousness “shift” states? How does Derrida explain such 
shifts? Perhaps as a preemptive measure against such questioning, Derrida introduces, over the 
course of his dealings with Austin and the concepts of intention and meaning presupposed by 
ordinary language philosophy, the “supplement” of a “structural unconscious,” which he 
describes as “alien” to and “incompatible with” conscious intention (Derrida [1977] 1988: 73). 
Even if, for the sake of argument, the existence of a structural unconscious is conceded, does not 
the existence of an “alien” entity pulling the strings of consciousness preclude such ethical 
haranguing as that to which Derrida subjects Searle? For a more sensible conception of 
consciousness, see Rand’s articulation of what she refers to as a “screen of vision” (Rand [1958] 
2000: 1-9). 
40 In his introduction to “The Origin of Geometry,” Derrida describes his fledgling philosophical 
method of deconstruction as the means by which to avoid in philosophical practice “aberration, 
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forgetfulness, and irresponsibility” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 52). However, in light of his fantasy of 
necessary inexpressiveness (and once again highlighting the relevance of Derrida’s own point 
about the implications of “coherence in contradiction” to the practice of deconstruction itself), is 
Derrida’s pathological fear throughout his career of “aberration, forgetfulness, and 
irresponsibility” not already a rejection of the claim that we are fated “to mean (to say) 
something that is (already, always, also) other than what we mean (to say)”? 
41 In “Force and Signification,” Derrida asks if it is possible for meaning to “come forth” if not 
“animated” by an intentionality, or animated by an intentionality which “does not necessarily and 
primarily belong to a consciousness” (Derrida [1964] 2001: 31). If one were to assess 
deconstruction as if Derrida believed it was possible – as supported, for example, by his critique 
of Lévi-Strauss – then Derrida’s critique of Rousset and his rejection of the idealization of the 
artistic object denuded of its “internal historicity” and “subjective origin” contradicts the terms 
of his own fantasy; if, however, one were to assess deconstruction as if Derrida believed it was 
not possible – as supported, for example, by his critique of Lacan – then Derrida’s reading of The 
Trial contradicts the terms of his own methodology. 
42 The troubling fact that Culler frames his landmark text on deconstruction according to the 
terms of Barthes’ hedonistic aesthetics clearly indicates that Culler was reading Derrida on 
Barthesian terms rather than on Derrida’s own terms and thus explains, in part, his distortion of 
deconstruction (Culler 1982: 31). Derrida himself claimed an undying “love for philosophy” 
(Derrida [1988] 1988: 122) and insisted on an “ethics of discussion” committed to the canons of 
logic, to “proof, discussion, and exchange” (Derrida [1988] 1988: 157) in the quest for “truth” –
concepts which Derrida states unequivocally he never sought to “put into question” in the sense 
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of contesting their objective existence in the world or their importance to human existence 
(Derrida [1988] 1988: 150). 
43 Additionally, the anarchic implication of Culler’s cartoonish characterization of deconstruction 
is that, in defiance of logic and reality, one can say and do whatever one wishes. Derrida, 
however, stressed that this was not his goal with deconstruction: “I have never accepted saying, 
or encouraging others to say, just anything at all, nor have I argued for indeterminacy as such … 
What has always interested me the most, what has always seemed to me the most rigorous … is 
not indeterminacy in itself, but the strictest possible determination[s] (Derrida [1988] 1988: 144-
145). 
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